Does Social Disagreement Attenuate Partisan Motivated Reasoning?
A Test Case Concerning Economic Evaluations

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Abstract:

Research on partisan motivated reasoning shows that citizens perceive the world differently based upon their partisan allegiances. Here we marshal evidence from several national surveys to investigate whether partisan motivated reasoning is attenuated among partisans situated within disagreeable political discussion networks. While our analyses suggest that exposure to interpersonal disagreement is associated with weaker partisan identities, we find limited evidence that disagreement attenuates partisan differences in knowledge or retrospective evaluations of the economy. This suggests that interpersonal disagreement is unlikely to be an easy panacea for partisan motivated reasoning. Our results thus speak to important debates concerning the influence of social discussion on political attitudes, the nature of partisan motivated reasoning, and the ability of citizens to hold elites accountable.

Keywords: Motivated Reasoning; Economic Evaluations; Political Knowledge; Political Discussion

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The data, replication instructions, and the data’s codebook can be found at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/CHBAYB
Representative democracies require citizens capable of holding elites accountable via the rewarding of good performance and the punishing of bad. It is against the backdrop of this normative claim that recent work on partisan motivated reasoning becomes worrying. Partisans generally try to expose themselves predominately to partisan friendly messages and vigorously dispute information harmful to their favored party (Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Stroud 2011). These processes of selective attention and interpretation may result in partisans unable to accurately perceive elite performance thereby threatening accountability efforts (Druckman 2014; Jerit and Barabas 2012; Lebo and Cassino 2007; Ramirez and Erickson 2014). These studies raise an important question: what types of contexts constrain partisan motivated reasoning?

Recent reviews have suggested one potential context that may attenuate partisan motivated reasoning: disagreeable political discussion networks (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014, 253; Leeper and Slothuus 2014, 144). The motivation to affirm and defend one’s partisan identity is not an unbounded impulse, but one that can be mitigated by the presence of continual streams of party-challenging information (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010). While partisans may work to construct news diets so as to minimize their mediated exposure to this type of information, political discussion with friends, family, and co-workers may operate as an alternative, and fairly pervasive, source of partisan challenge. Individuals may encounter reasons to question their partisan allegiances via such discussions which, in turn, may prompt them to hold weaker partisan identities and thereby experience a diminished motivation to selectively process political information (Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013; Sinclair 2012). The possibility that social disagreement may
attenuate partisan biases is politically and theoretically important, but one that has not received much prior attention.¹ Our central question is thus: does exposure to political disagreement within one’s political discussion network attenuate partisan motivated reasoning?

We contribute to the literatures on partisan motivated reasoning and interpersonal discussion by exploring their interrelationship with regards to a politically important manifestation of partisan motivated reasoning: citizens’ propensity to evaluate the national economy based on the partisanship of the incumbent government (Bartels 2008; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Enns and McAvoy 2012; Evans and Andersen 2006; Evans and Pickup 2010). Existing work shows that supporters of the incumbent party will discount negative, and opponents positive, information about economic performance. Partisan disagreements over economic performance raise troubling questions regarding the ability of the mass public to discharge its role in holding elites accountable given the important role such evaluations play as a consideration guiding vote choices (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Fiorina 1981).² We will thus explore whether social disagreement disrupts these patterns. In particular, we will investigate whether the level of disagreement within a partisan’s political discussion network is associated with an increased propensity to make partisan-incongruent evaluations of the economy when

¹ One notable exception is Klar (2014), which we discuss in greater detail below.

² Of course, even if partisans agree that the economy is doing well or poorly they may still disagree about who or what is responsible with partisanship guiding this attributional process, as in Bisgaard (2015) and Tilley and Hobolt (2011). However, this type of disagreement strikes us as less normatively problematic. Agreement on factual matters is a precursor to collective deliberation and thus intrinsically valuable.
called for, e.g. for out-partisans to render more positive evaluations of economic conditions during good economic times.

We marshal the best available observational evidence concerning the relationship between interpersonal disagreement and partisan motivated reasoning on economic matters. Specifically, we use evidence from five national surveys from the United States to explore how partisan differences in factual knowledge and subjective retrospective assessments of the economy vary according to the extent of disagreement in partisans’ discussion networks. Our results provide meager support for the claim that interpersonal disagreement attenuates partisan bias in this domain. On the one hand, exposure to disagreement is associated with an increased propensity to correctly answer factual questions about the economy when such facts are incongruent with the respondent’s partisan identity, but the evidence is somewhat mixed across the surveys. On the other hand, we find that network disagreement does little to consistently affect partisans’ subjective evaluations of the economy in a way consistent with an attenuation of partisan reasoning strategies. Our results thus suggest that interpersonal disagreement is no panacea for partisan motivated reasoning.

**Partisanship, Motivated Cognition, and Economic Assessments**

The past several decades have witnessed a resurgence of work on the motivated bases of human cognition and has resulted in an understanding that human reasoning and information processing is goal-directed (Kunda 1990). In the political realm particular attention has been paid to directional goals (Leeper and Slothuus 2014; Lodge and Taber 2006; Nir 2011b). When directional goals are salient, which appears to be generally, individuals select and process information so as to favor a particular outcome, i.e. to affirm one’s status in, and defend the validity of, one’s partisan identity. Directional reasoning may manifest in selective exposure
where individuals seek out attitudinally congruent information (Druckman, Fein, and Leeper 2012; Lodge and Taber 2006; Stroud 2011). Meanwhile, when discordant information is encountered directional goals stimulate active cognitive efforts to rationalize and reject this information (Lodge and Taber 2006; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Mullinix 2016). This work largely supports the argument that partisans often see the world through a partisan perceptual screen (Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014; Campbell et al. 1960).

The operation of partisan guided reasoning processes can help explain partisan disagreements concerning economic performance. First, partisans may pay attention to different news sources which report economic news in a divergent manner (Larcinese, Puglisi, and Snyder Jr. 2011; Stroud 2011). In addition, partisans may also selectively perceive information about economic performance when it is received (Bartels 2008; Enns, Kellstedt, and McAvoy 2012; Lebo and Cassino 2007; Ramirez and Erickson 2014). Finally, partisans may be motivated to selectively report their perceptions so as to maintain the positive value of their identity (Bullock et al. 2015; Prior, Sood, and Khanna 2015).3 While partisan disagreements over the economy are not entirely the fault of these partisan biases, economic perceptions appear to be strongly guided by their relevance for the validity of one’s partisan identity.4 This recurrent finding raises a

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3 Notably, Prior, Sood, and Khanna show this by invoking a social accountability motive on the part of respondents, i.e. a similar type of stimulus as explored here.

4 There exist additional explanations for partisan disagreements in retrospective economic assessments. For instance, partisan groups may place differential weights on unemployment and inflation thereby yielding different perceptions of the economy; see, Gerber and Green (1999). However, studies of aggregate responses to economic information suggest that unemployment
politically and normatively important question: what types of political and social contexts constrain partisan motivated reasoning?

Social Networks, Disagreement, and the Potential Reduction of Partisan Bias

Individuals do not form political opinions in a vacuum. Rather, political attitudes are greatly influenced by interactions with other citizens and particularly the friends, family, and acquaintances that comprise their political discussion networks (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 2006; Sinclair 2012). Particularly relevant for our purposes are studies demonstrating that the extent of political disagreement within these networks is consequential. In particular, prior work connects exposure to interpersonal disagreement with weaker (e.g. less extreme and more ambivalent) issue and candidate preferences, greater openness to persuasion, enhanced knowledge of the legitimate rationales for opposing viewpoints, and with a greater openness to voting for candidates from different political parties (Bloom and Levitan 2011; Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn 2004; Lupton, Singh, and Thornton 2015; Mutz 2002a, 2002b; Pattie and Johnston 2008; Robison, Leeper, and Druckman 2018; Sinclair 2012; Visser and Mirabile 2004). Individuals situated within discussion networks with high levels of disagreement appear to be more ‘deliberative’ in their political attitude formation processes.\(^5\)

\(^5\) While our focus lies on the discussions citizens have informally with their peers, research on small group decision making and democratic deliberation also highlight the importance of disagreement in opinion formation processes (e.g., Barabas 2004; Mendelberg 2002; Wojcieszak 2012). Perhaps particularly notable is the literature on group polarization wherein small group
While the foregoing studies are not explicitly focused on partisan motivated reasoning, they nevertheless provide a reasonable basis for suggesting that interpersonal disagreement will also help attenuate partisan reasoning biases. However, we are aware of only one study that explicitly explores this possibility, Klar’s (2014) experimental study showing that respondents assigned to a mixed discussion setting demonstrated less evidence of partisan bias in reactions to persuasive messages than those assigned to a discussion context consisting only of co-partisans. While important evidence, disagreeable discussions in this study occurred in an evenly divided setting (i.e. four Democrats and four Republicans) among individuals who did not know each other, and thus had little expectation of future interactions, which may prevent easy generalization to more common networks wherein peers know each other, broadly expect to interact again in the future, and where disagreement is either more or less one-sided (Nir 2005, 2011a). Moreover, Klar could only look at the responses of Democratic students, leaving open the possibility that effects will vary across partisan groups or among older individuals. Ultimately, a test of the argument that exposure to interpersonal disagreement within discussion networks undermines directional motivated reasoning requires replication with evidence from more naturalistic discussion networks.

As is done by Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook (2014), Druckman (2014), and Leeper and Slothuus (2014).
Why might an individual’s susceptibility to partisan motivated reasoning vary alongside the level of political disagreement within their political discussion network? Information processing is not only guided by directional goals such as the desire to affirm one’s partisan identity, but is instead a balancing act between directional, accuracy, and efficiency goals (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen 1996; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012). The priority given to a directional goal will depend upon the relative strength of this goal. In the current context the directional goal is the motive to defend one’s partisan identity, which is rooted in the strength and relevance of the partisan identity for the individual. As partisan identity strength increases, in other words, so too will an individual’s propensity to act in such a way as to affirm the validity of their partisan allegiance (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015; Mullinix 2016).

Partisan motivated reasoning increases alongside identity strength. Crucially, higher levels of social disagreement are likely to be associated with weaker partisan identities much as they are with issue attitudes more generally (for instance: Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013; Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; Sinclair 2012). The extent of disagreement within a network will influence the type of information an individual receives regarding political affairs. Agreeable partners, i.e. partners with the same partisan identity, provide identity-congruent information that can be used to further bolster the validity of one’s partisan allegiance. Disagreeable partners, i.e. those with dissimilar partisan preferences, may instead provide identity-challenging information. For instance, discussions with disagreeable others provides insight into the legitimate rationales for the other side’s positions which may lead to more positive views of the other side and hence identity ambivalence (Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012; Mutz 2002a; Mutz and Mondak 2006; Pattie and Johnston 2008; Price, Cappella, and Nir 2002). In addition, partisans tend to believe the other side to be homogenous in
nature, which facilitates perceptions of party polarization and hence an increased likelihood that an individual will self-categorize as a partisan and work to defend their partisan identity (Ahler and Sood n.d.; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013). However, discussing politics with individuals from the other side can disrupt these stereotypes and mitigate perceptions of polarization, which should thus disrupt partisan self-categorization processes and hence reduce the relevance of the partisan identity to the individual (Buttice, Huckfeldt, and Ryan 2009; Lyons and Sokhey 2017). Finally, disagreeable others can be a conduit to information contained in media sources a partisan would otherwise ignore thereby providing a route for party-critical information to reach them (Druckman, Levendusky, and McLain 2018). Given that interpersonal discussion networks tend to be tilted toward close ties, i.e. friends and family, this incongruent information is potentially more credible, and hence effective, than if it had been encountered from elite out-partisan sources (Huckfeldt 2001; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Lupia 2002; Mutz 2006; Sinclair 2012). And, while exposure to disagreement may inspire efforts to counter-argue, continual exposure to incongruent information, as we might expect to occur in ongoing social relationships, can break down this tendency (Lodge and Taber 2006; Redlawsk, Civettini, and Emmerson 2010). Partisans within disagreeable networks may thus possess both the information necessary to come to more accurate understandings of the economy as well as a diminished motivation to resist this information due to weakened (i.e. less extreme or more ambivalent) identities.

If partisan motivated reasoning is rooted in the strength of an individual’s partisan identity, and higher levels of disagreement undermines identity strength, then it is plausible that partisans within more disagreeable networks will evince lesser evidence of partisan motivated reasoning. What would this look like? We focus on whether disagreement is associated with an
increased likelihood that partisans express party-incongruent beliefs regarding the national economy as it is in this arena that motivated reasoning related biases should be most apparent. Our specific focus is on partisans’ knowledge of facts regarding economic performance and their retrospective economic evaluations. If disagreement undermines partisan motivated reasoning, then it should help promote the expression of these incongruent beliefs when called for.

**H1:** Increasing levels of political disagreement will be associated with an increased likelihood of expressing partisan-incongruent beliefs about the national economy, all else equal.

To illustrate this hypothesis let us first consider individuals that identify with the same party as the incumbent government, what we will call in-partisans. These individuals will generally be motivated to process information to the advantage of their co-partisans in government. During positive economic conditions this is not too difficult as incoming economic information aligns with that motivation. However, when economic conditions sour there should exist friction between this party defensive motivation and incoming information that will depress the likelihood that in-partisans will correctly answer economy-related knowledge questions and report negative evaluations of the national economy. However, if the level of disagreement within a partisan’s political discussion network attenuates partisan motivated reasoning, then we would expect to see an increased likelihood of correctly answering economy-related factual questions and reporting negative evaluations of the economy among this partisan group even though such beliefs clash with one’s goal of defending one’s partisan team. Our expectations regarding out-partisans are the inverse. We are interested in out-partisan reactions during positive economic conditions as this is when there should exist friction between partisan defensive motivations and one’s incoming information. Our hypothesis holds that disagreement
will be associated with increased knowledge and increasingly positive evaluations for this group in such contexts.

**Methods**

We draw on five national surveys conducted in the United States to investigate our hypotheses. Specifically, we use data from the US version of the 1992 Cross-National Election Project (CNEP), the 2000 ANES Time Series (TS), the panel component of the 2002 ANES Time Series wherein respondents from the 2000 ANES TS were re-interviewed (hereafter 2002 ANES Panel), the 2006 ANES Pilot, and several waves from the 2008-2009 ANES Panel survey. There are several advantages to using this array of data sources. First, the surveys were conducted in varying economic conditions, which enables us to test our specific in- and out-partisan expectations.\(^7\) Table OA1 in the Online Appendix provides economic statistics for each survey. Broadly speaking, the surveys conducted in 1992, 2002, and 2008-2009 were fielded during negative economic conditions, while those fielded in 2000 and 2006 took place in more positive economic conditions. A second advantage of using this array of surveys is that it enables us to look at contexts both where a Democrat or a Republican was President and thus enables variation in which partisan team is considered ‘in-partisans’ and which are considered ‘out-partisans’. Finally, the 2002 ANES Panel and 2008-2009 ANES Panel surveys enable us to obtain some distance between the measurement of our independent variables (partisanship and

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\(^7\) In addition, prior work suggests that individuals are more sensitive to negative than positive economic conditions and information and thus variation in economic conditions can enable us to avoid making inferences based on only a single economic context; see, for instance, Soroka (2006) and Stanig (2013).
network disagreement) and our dependent variables as in both cases the former were measured anywhere from one month to two years prior in time to the latter.

**Core Independent Variables: Partisanship and Network Disagreement**

We will detail our dependent variables in the sections to come. However, let us first note the nature of our two main independent variables. **Partisanship** is a binary indicator coded so that partisans that identify with the same party as the incumbent President (in-partisans) are given a score of 1 and partisans identifying with the opposite party receive a score of 0 (out-partisans). Thus, we code Republican respondents as in-partisans in 1992, 2002 and 2006 when a President Bush occupied the White House while Democrats in these survey-years are as out-partisans. Meanwhile, we code Republican respondents as out-partisans and Democrats as in-partisans in 2000 and the two 2009 panel waves due to the presence of a Democratic President at the time of the survey. Leaning partisans are included in this binary measure while pure Independents are excluded from the analysis given the focus on difference in response between partisan groups.

Respondents on each survey completed a battery of items concerning their political discussion network. These batteries always began with a name-generator question wherein respondents were asked whether they discussed politics/important matters with anyone or not. Notably, asking individuals about peers with whom they discuss “important matters” versus politics does not appear to elicit different types of responses (Klofstad, McClurg, and Rolfe 2009). On the ANES surveys, the network generators were included on the post-election wave of the 2000 ANES, the 2006 Pilot which occurred after the 2006 mid-term election, and the September 2008 wave of the 2008-2009 ANES Panel which began in January 2008. Note that we are focusing here on those individuals that completed the battery, i.e. those that said they discuss
politics or important matters with at least one person, as is customary (Mutz 2002b; Sinclair 2012; Sokhey and McClurg 2012).

Individuals that said yes to this initial question were then asked detailed questions concerning up to 5 (1992 CNEP), 4 (ANES 2000 TS/ANES 2002 Panel) or 3 (ANES 2006, ANES 2008-9) discussants. The types of individuals typically captured by these name generators tend to be relatively strong ties (i.e. close friends, spouses and family members), but co-workers, i.e. generally weaker ties, also represent a significant percentage of discussants as well (see: Klofstad, McClurg, and Rolfe 2009, Table 2). While these questions, and our resultant measures, focus on respondents’ perceptions of their discussants, prior research suggests that individuals are often quite accurate in these perceptions and that it is the perception, not the reality, that influences individuals (Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn 2004, 69; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, 154–55; Mutz 2002b).

On each survey respondents were asked about the political views of their named discussants. Respondents were asked about the Presidential candidate preference of each discussant on the 1992 CNEP and 2000 ANES TS/2002 ANES Panel surveys, while on the remainder of the surveys they were asked about discussant partisanship. Our measure of Network Disagreement was calculated by subtracting the number of discussants with the same PID or candidate preference, i.e. agreeable discussants (A), from the number of discussants with different preferences (D; Network Disagreement = D - A; Lupton, Singh, and Thornton 2015; Lupton and Thornton 2017). The resulting variable ranges from -5 to +5 on the 1992 CNEP.

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Discussants for whom the respondent reported not knowing a political preference necessarily do not contribute to the disagreement measure as we do not have the information necessarily to
to +4 on the 2000 and 2002 ANES, and -3 to +3 on the 2006 and 2008-2009 ANES surveys with higher scores indicating greater potential exposure to disagreement. Respondents scoring below 0 are situated within networks with more agreeable than disagreeable partners, while those above 0 experience an overall tilt toward disagreement in the network. While the mean value on this variable is below 0 for all surveys, most respondents nevertheless possess at least one disagreeable partner.

**Control Variables and Dealing with Potential Selection Issues**

categorize these dyads. We discuss the nature of these ‘missing’ discussants in Online Appendix C. Disagreeable dyads in this coding scheme count non-major party partners as disagreeable (i.e. a Democrat/Independent pairing). We investigate the consequences of this coding choice in Online Appendix C and find that focusing only on major party dyads yields the same pattern of results reported below.

In Online Appendix D we explore alternative specifications of exposure to disagreement, including measures that incorporate information about the size of the network, frequency of political discussion, the perceived political sophistication of the discussants, the perceived closeness of discussants, and how much the respondent ‘generally’ disagrees about political matters with the discussant into the D-A framework. Using these alternative specifications would not substantially change the conclusions we reach.

The mean values were: -0.93 (SD: 2.01) in 1992, -1.05 (1.63) in 2000, -1.16 (1.64) in 2006, and -0.85 (2.00) in 2008. The median value for all four surveys was -1. The percentage of respondents with at least one disagreeable discussant in their networks is 58% (1992), 44% (2000), 51% (2006), and 59% (2008).
Our data on social network composition is observational in nature, which necessarily limits our ability to speak to the causality of the relationships shown below. One potential worry is that individuals could plausibly select into networks based on its level of political disagreement. While we cannot remove such concerns we address them in two ways. First, Sinclair notes that social networks typically do not form based on shared political beliefs but instead on other social characteristics (Sinclair 2012). She thus recommends controlling “for the social characteristics that generate homophily” as one means of reducing endogeneity concerns (Sinclair 2012, 16). All analyses reported here control for age, gender, education, race, family income, marital status, and political interest/news attention for just this reason. In addition, the ANES analyses contain measures for the respondent’s need for cognition and need to evaluate, which are included as controls because these cognitive style indicators have previously been connected with an individual’s general propensity to engage in directional motivated reasoning.

11 These variables are also important to account for insofar as they are likely to influence economic evaluations and knowledge (e.g., Conover, Feldman, and Knight 1986; Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000; Haller and Norporth 1997; Hetherington 1996). Also included in the models below are measures of network size and network sophistication.

12 One potential concern here is that variables such as political interest/news attention, and perhaps even the cognitive style indicators, may themselves be endogenous to network composition in which case controlling for them would introduce post-treatment bias to our estimates. We investigate the robustness of our estimates to this consideration in Online Appendix B. We compare results from three models: no control variables, just (reasonably) exogenous demographic variables, and all controls. The same pattern of results discussed below
Second, we leverage the panel nature of the ANES surveys in analyses reported in Online Appendix E by replicating our analyses using a measure of disagreement that has been pre-processed using a matching algorithm. Specifically, in each case we can use measures obtained in waves conducted prior to when network disagreement was measured to obtain greater balance between ‘treated’ (i.e. high levels of disagreement) and ‘control’ (i.e. low levels of disagreement) on a variety of predictors that may explain both a respondent’s propensity to engage in partisan motivated reasoning and their selection into disagreeable networks (e.g. cognitive style, prior partisan identity strength, and political sophistication). Notably, our substantive conclusions remain the same. While these tactics cannot fully deal with worries concerning self-selection and endogeneity, they are the best tools available to us here. We will return to this point in the conclusion.

**Results**

**Disagreement and Knowledge of Inconvenient Facts**

Partisans within disagreeable discussion networks are expected to evince weaker motivations to defend their partisan identity, which should lead be associated with an increase in knowledge of partisan ‘inconvenient’ facts (H1). We can test this hypothesis using data from the 2000 ANES and 2008-2009 ANES Panel surveys. In both cases respondents were asked to indicate whether they believed that the federal budget deficit had grown smaller, larger, or stayed the same relative to some prior point in time.\(^{13}\) On the 2000 ANES this measure was asked on the 13 While the deficit is perhaps not as clearly an ‘economic’ issue as is the unemployment or inflation rate, it is nevertheless connected to economic performance (e.g. growing deficits in
post-election wave of the survey and the reference point was 1992, i.e. the beginning of President Clinton’s administration. Respondents on the 2008-2009 Panel, meanwhile, were asked this question in both May and July 2009 with a reference point of January 2009, i.e. the beginning of President Obama’s term in office. In both cases the question admits an unambiguously correct response that is potentially inconvenient for one partisan team. In the former case, a budget deficit in 1992 had turned into a budget surplus by 2000, a fact that out-partisans (i.e. Republicans) should be less likely to report knowing as it speaks favorably to the economic record of President Clinton. Meanwhile, the year 2009 saw a deficit in January grow larger month by month due to efforts to combat the financial crisis, a fact potentially inconvenient for in-partisans (i.e. Democrats). We thus expect lower levels of knowledge among out-partisans in 2000 and in-partisans in 2009. \textbf{H1} posits a positive effect of disagreement on answering correctly for partisans in these two groups.

\textbf{\textsuperscript{14}} Half of the 2000 ANES sample received this question on the pre-election wave and half on the post-election wave. As network disagreement was measured on the post-election wave, we focus only on the latter sample.
We predict deficit knowledge (1 = correct, 0 = incorrect) with a logit model that includes the interaction between network disagreement and partisanship and the controls discussed earlier. We present the full results in the Online Appendix and concentrate on Figure 1, which plots the average predicted probability of a correct response by partisanship and network disagreement. As a first point, we can note that partisanship is related to knowledge as we expected: in-partisans were more likely to answer correctly in 2000 and less likely to answer correctly in May & July 2009. This difference was sizable in all years, with in-partisans being, on average, approximately 22% more likely to be correct in 2000 but 14%, and 19% less likely to be correct in May and July 2009 respectively.\textsuperscript{15} The correctness of a respondent’s perceptions of the deficit is strongly related to their partisan loyalties.

\textbf{Figure 1:} Network Disagreement and Knowledge of the Federal Budget Deficit

\textsuperscript{15} The average marginal effects of partisanship (i.e. the difference between in-partisans and out-partisans) from a model without the interaction with disagreement was 0.22 [95% CI: 0.13, 0.32], -0.14 [-0.20, -0.08], and -0.19 [-0.25, -0.13] respectively. Partisanship remains significant in the interaction models where the coefficient indicates differences in knowledge among those with a disagreement score of 0, which covers respondents that have an equal number of agreeable and disagreeable discussion partners.
Notes: Markers provide the average predicted probability of a correct answer (w/95% confidence intervals) by partisanship and network disagreement (x-axis). Information regarding the slope of each line and its statistical significance is provided in each subgraph. Dotted lines represent the 5th and 95th percentile of network disagreement. See Table OA6 for the full results. In-Partisans = Democrats, Out-Partisans = Republicans in both waves.

We now turn to the role of network disagreement where we see partial evidence in favor of H1. Disagreement is estimated to have a positive, but statistically insignificant, influence on an out-partisan’s likelihood of answering correctly in the year 2000. The results from the two 2008-2009 ANES Panel surveys are likewise mixed. While knowledge does not vary alongside network disagreement for in-partisans in May 2009, a positive and statistically significant relationship between disagreement and knowledge does emerge for in-partisans two months later in July. Notably, the substantive effect of disagreement is sizable in both 2000 among out-partisans and July 2009 among in-partisans albeit more precisely measured in the latter instance.
The estimated change in the probability of a correct response per one unit change in disagreement is approximately 3-4% in both cases which yields average predicted gains in knowledge of approximately 20% when moving from the 5th to 95th percentile in disagreement. Figure 1 thus offers some qualified evidence in support of the role of network disagreement in constraining partisan motivated reasoning.

Recall that individuals participating in the July 2009 wave of the ANES 2008-2009 panel may also have completed the May 2009 survey. This offers us the possibility of exploring how network disagreement affects learning via an exploration of July responses among respondents that were incorrect in May. We did this by adding a dummy variable for respondent correctness in May to the July 2009 model and then re-calculating the average predicted probability of a correct response among previously incorrect respondents; the final subgraph of Figure 1 provides the results. Out-partisans incorrect in May have a high predicted probability of being correct in July regardless of the level of network disagreement. More intriguingly, we find a strong positive effect of network disagreement among previously incorrect in-partisans consistent H1. This relationship, moreover, is substantial albeit quite noisy; previously incorrect in-partisans at the 5th percentile of disagreement have a predicted probability of a correct response in July of 0.40 [0.28, 0.52] while those at the 95th percentile are nearly twice as likely to be correct on average (0.72 [0.58, 0.86]). In this case disagreement appears to be facilitating the learning of partisan incongruent beliefs about the economy.

\(^{16}\) In 2000: \(b_{\text{out-partisan}} = 0.03 [-0.02, 0.08] \); in July 2009: \(b_{\text{in-partisan}} = 0.04 [0.01, 0.06] \)

\(^{17}\) 2389 respondents completed the May wave, while 2178 of these respondents also completed the July wave.
Partisanship, Disagreement, and Economic Evaluations

We provide a second, and perhaps harder, test of the argument that network disagreement will associated with an attenuation of partisan motivated reasoning through an exploration of evaluations of the national economy. We say ‘harder’ because it is possible for partisans to accept facts about the world but nevertheless interpret them in such a way as to deny their negative partisan implications (Bisgaard 2015; Gaines et al. 2007). Given the important role retrospective evaluations play in vote choices, this relationship is crucial to investigate.

Respondents on all five surveys were asked to indicate whether the economy was better, about the same, or worse relative to some reference point in the past although there was some variation in the wording of the questions. Respondents on the 1992 CNEP survey were asked to evaluate the state of the economy relative to two years prior. Respondents on the 2000 ANES TS, on the other hand, were asked to indicate whether the economy was better/worse/about the same “compared to 1992”.18 Respondents on the 2002 Panel and 2006 Pilot surveys, meanwhile, were both asked to evaluate the state of the economy relative to a year prior. Finally, respondents on the 2008-2009 ANES Panel were asked in May 2009 and July 2009 to evaluate the state of the economy relative to January 2009, i.e. when President Obama officially became President.19

18 These respondents were also asked about the state of the national economy relative to a year prior. Unfortunately, this measure was contained on the pre-election wave of the survey, while the network measures used here appeared on the post-election wave.

19 Respondents on this survey were also asked for their retrospective economic assessments in October and November 2008 in waves that come after the measurement of social disagreement. However, the financial crisis of 2008 led to near unanimity in perceptions of the economy, with over 90% of Republicans and Democrats indicating that the economy was worse than a year
In the analyses that follow we code these measures so that higher scores indicate a belief that the economy was doing better than in the reference period. For some of these measures respondents could only answer on a 3-pt scale (1992 CNEP, 2006 ANES Pilot), while the remainder enabled respondents to also indicate whether the economy was much or somewhat better/worse. All in-text analyses will use focus on a 3-pt Worse/Same/Better structure. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for each measure.

**Table 1: Economic Evaluations Across the Surveys**

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<th>% Better</th>
<th>% Same</th>
<th>% Worse</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>72.65</td>
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<td>4.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Out-Partisans</td>
<td>67.75</td>
<td>27.36</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>16.89, p &lt; 0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2002 ANES Panel</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
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<td>21.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Out-Partisans</td>
<td>50.51</td>
<td>39.25</td>
<td>10.24</td>
<td>94.95, p &lt; 0.01</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

prior. As this extreme reality constraint nearly extinguished partisan biases we will not investigate it in text. Our analyses of these items are provided in Online Appendix Table OA5; here we show that in-partisans continue to provide more optimistic accounts of the economy (mainly by saying the economy is the “same” as the year prior as virtually nobody says “better”).

Both in- and out-partisans become slightly more likely to say that the economy is “worse” than a year prior with increasing exposure to disagreement, but the effect is insubstantial due to the extremely high base rate.
Much as with our earlier analyses we are principally concerned with the evaluations of in-partisans in negative economic conditions and the reactions of out-partisans during good times as these contexts are the ones wherein partisan defensive motivations are perhaps most easily observed. We predicted each retrospective evaluation measure using an ordinal logit model using partisanship, network disagreement, their interaction, and the same bevy of control variables as predictors. To facilitate interpretation of these results we focus on Figure 2, which plots the average predicted probability of a respondent saying that the economy is “better” by the level of disagreement in their network (x-axis) and their partisanship. Evidence consistent with $H1$ would thus take the form of a positively sloped line for out-partisans in the good economic conditions of 2000 and 2006 (e.g. Republicans and Democrats respectively) and negatively sloped lines for in-partisans in 1992, 2002, and in May & July 2009 (i.e. Republicans in 1992 and 2002 and Democrats in 2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2006 ANES Pilot</th>
<th>ANES: May 2009</th>
<th>ANES: July 2009</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>31.70</td>
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<td>48.34</td>
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<td>10.36</td>
<td>6.00</td>
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<td></td>
<td>38.24</td>
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<td>30.06</td>
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<td>42.89</td>
<td>41.39</td>
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<td>84.00</td>
<td>83.51</td>
<td>211.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$p &lt; 0.01$</td>
<td>$p &lt; 0.01$</td>
<td>$p &lt; 0.01$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cells provide the % of respondents giving each response. The final column provides the results of a chi-squared test between in- and out-partisans. Republicans = In-Partisans in 1992, 2002, and 2006 (out-partisans the other years). Democrats = In-Partisans in 2000 and May/July 2009 (out-partisans the other years).
As Table 1 shows, in-partisans adopted more positive evaluations of the national economy than out-partisans in all years save for 2002. These differences remain statistically significant in multivariate models. However, Figure 2 provides meager evidence that disagreement affected these differences in the manner hypothesized to occur. We can begin here with an analysis of disagreement during positive economic conditions, i.e. in the years 2000 and 2006 where unemployment was low, consumer confidence high, and economic growth positive. The critical test, recall, is whether disagreement is associated with increased positivity in the evaluations of out-partisans as revealed by a positively sloped line in Figure 2, i.e. with whether Republicans (Democrats) are more likely to give President Clinton (Bush) his due for good economic performance.

**Figure 2:** Network Disagreement and Partisan Differences in Economic Evaluations
Notes: Markers provide the average predicted probability of the respondent saying the economy is “better” (w/95% confidence intervals) by partisanship and network disagreement (x-axis). Information regarding the slope of each line and its statistical significance is provided in each subgraph. Dotted lines represent the 5th and 95th percentile of network disagreement. Republicans = In-Partisans in 1992, 2002, and 2006 (out-partisans the other years). Democrats = In-Partisans in 2000 and May/July 2009 (out-partisans the other years).

performance. The evidence is not positive on this front; in 2000, out-partisans actually become a bit less likely to say that the economy is “better” as disagreement increases while in 2006 a flat line emerges for out-partisans across network disagreement. Indeed, the sub-graph for 2006 shows in-partisans become significantly more negative about the economy as disagreement increases indicating that disagreement for these individuals may be facilitating inaccurate evaluations. There is thus little evidence that network disagreement facilitates more accurate evaluations among out-partisans in good economic conditions.

The remainder of the surveys occurred in more negative economic contexts. In such conditions out-partisans should readily say that the economy is poor, while in-partisans may be more likely to say it is good to defend their partisan team. Thus, the key question is whether disagreement breaks down this latter pattern (i.e. leads to more pessimistic evaluations of the economy among in-partisans) as revealed by a negatively sloped line in the figure. Figure 2 provides little evidence in favor of this conclusion outside of the 1992 CNEP survey. In-partisans on this survey do report increasingly pessimistic readings of the national economy as their

\[ b = -0.06 \pm 0.10, -0.02 \]

Among in-partisans, the average marginal effect of disagreement on the probability of saying “better” is \( b = -0.06 \pm 0.10, -0.02 \), while for out-partisans it was \( -0.003 \pm 0.03, 0.02 \).

In-partisans in 1992 and 2002 would be Republican respondents, while in-partisans for the two 2009 waves would be Democrats.
exposure to interpersonal disagreement increases. For instance, an in-partisan at the 5th percentile of network disagreement, i.e. low levels of disagreement, has an average predicted probability of 0.19 [0.13, 0.25] for saying “better” and 0.37 [0.29, 0.46] of saying “worse”. Meanwhile, in-partisans at the 95th percentile, i.e. high disagreement, do appear much more pessimistic, being both less likely to say “better” (0.09 [0.05, 0.14]) and more likely to say worse (0.57 [0.47, 0.68]). However, in none of the other three surveys does disagreement have a significant negative (positive) effect on the probability that in-partisans say the economy is better (worse). 22

To the extent that partisan groups look similar in these surveys it appears to be the result of the broader economy exerting a reality constraint on respondents. Figure 2 thus provides weak evidence that network disagreement attenuates partisan motivated reasoning when it comes to economic evaluations.

**Network Disagreement and Partisan Identity, An Interlude**

There is inconsistent evidence in favor of the proposition that social disagreement undermines partisan motivated reasoning. Why is this so? One possibility is that our supposition that disagreement weakens partisan identities, and hence the motivation to defend them, may be incorrect. After all, both partisan identities and political discussion networks may be characterized as relatively stable due to the former’s early development and the latter being principally composed of close, and stable, relationships (Campbell et al. 1960; Klofstad, 22

22 To be clear, the average estimated effect of disagreement on the probability of the respondent saying “better” is negative, but it is small and noisy: -0.003 [-0.04, 0.03] in 2002, -0.01 [-0.03, 0.01] in May 2009, and -0.004 [-0.02, 0.01] in July 2009.
McClurg, and Rolfe 2009). Perhaps this link in the causal chain is missing and that is why we fail to see stronger effects. We test this possibility in analyses reported in Online Appendix A. Of particular interest are analyses from the 2008-2009 ANES Panel wherein we have both temporal distance between disagreement and measures of partisan identity extremity as well as multiple indicators of extremity recorded anywhere from one to ten months later in time. This contrasts with the limited existing work on this subject that tends only to examine a single recording of extremity. Notably, partisans in highly disagreeable networks in September 2008 report substantially less extreme identities in future survey waves even while controlling for pre-September reports of identity extremity. This pattern also emerges in analyses of the cross-sectional datasets. While partisans in disagreeable networks possess weaker partisan identities and thus putatively possess weaker motivations to defend those identities, they nevertheless do not evince a reduced likelihood of consistently adopting identity-incongruent economic evaluations. We discuss some reasons why in our concluding discussion.

**Conclusion**

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\(^{23}\) We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point salient.

\(^{24}\) Klofstad et al. (2013), for instance, only examine a single report of identity strength whereas we focus on four such reports. In addition, we also include analyses of partisan identity ambivalence, which contributes to prior work that has focused primarily on extremity (either directly so or via measures of identity change, e.g. Sinclair 2012). We find that disagreement is associated with increased ambivalence which is consistent with cross-sectional evidence (e.g. Lavine et al. 2012) as well as with studies of disagreement and ambivalence in issue attitudes or candidate preferences (e.g. Mirabile and Visser 2004).
We have investigated whether interpersonal disagreement mitigates partisan differences in economic perceptions by undermining the individual’s underlying motivation to defend their partisan team against negative information. Using the best available observational data we have shown limited evidence in favor of this possibility. On the one hand, we found some evidence that exposure to disagreement may facilitate the learning of inconvenient political facts, but some of this evidence was statistically imprecise (i.e. the 2000 ANES analyses) and the effect failed to manifest in another survey (May 2009 analyses). On the other hand, we found scant evidence that the level of disagreement in a partisan’s network was associated with an attenuation of partisan biases in evaluations of the national economy outside of the 1992 CNEP survey. At the very least, we feel that our analyses suggest that network disagreement is no easy panacea for concerns over partisan motivated reasoning. In the remainder of this manuscript we will discuss some of the implications of our study for future research.

We begin by discussing the potential role of self-selection in this study. As noted earlier, we utilize observational data, which raises the specter that partisans will select into disagreeable or agreeable networks based on background characteristics. It is thus worth considering the potential role these selection pressures may have on the results found in this study. When it comes to our analyses of economic evaluations and factual knowledge, the concern with self-selection is that individuals prone to avoiding directional motivated reasoning will self-select into disagreeable contexts and thus evidence of a reduction in partisan motivated reasoning is spurious. Much as above we cannot fully evade such concerns with observational evidence. However, by controlling for need for cognition and need to evaluate we believe we are capturing some of this process. Moreover, we actually found scant evidence that partisans within disagreeable networks showed lesser evidence of partisan motivated reasoning. Given that
selection processes, to the extent that they are present, are likely pushing in the opposite direction, we feel that this further speaks to the validity of our results. However, future work could build on these findings, and those related to partisan identity strength, by leveraging natural experiments that introduce exogenous variation into networks, as in Klofstad’s study of dorm assignments (Klofstad 2010). In the end, we believe that our results offer the most comprehensive available portrait of the relationship between social disagreement and partisan motivated reasoning, self-selection warts and all.

Perhaps the most important question to emerge from this study concerns how we should interpret the rather mixed evidence that emerges in our analyses. We see at least two possibilities here. First, the mixed evidence here may suggest that network disagreement plays little consistent role in undermining partisan defensive motivations, at least in this domain. While interpersonal disagreement may undermine a partisan’s identity strength, and hence their motivation to counter-argue inconsistent information, it may nevertheless be the case that these partisans still have sufficient motivation and resources to rebut party-incongruent information. Moreover, the very act of discussion may prompt individuals to more deeply consider information and, via this enhanced elaboration, formulate issue-specific attitudes more resistant to change even in the midst of weakened partisan identities (Levendusky, Druckman, and McLain 2016). If this is the case, then scholars interested in understanding the nature of partisan motivated reasoning, and particularly its limits, may be better off exploring broader contextual features of the environment such as elite polarization, the nature of a nation’s political institutions and their resulting influence on partisan identities, or the nature of news discourse, than focusing on interpersonal relationships (e.g., Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Lupu 2015; Robison and Mullinix 2016).
An alternative interpretation of the results reported here is that disagreement’s influence may in fact be conditional in nature. For instance, it may be no accident that we observed stronger results on measures of factual knowledge than on retrospective evaluations as partisans may come to accept identity-incongruent facts but simply respond by rationalizing them on measures that invite more subjectivity (Bisgaard 2015; Gaines et al. 2007). Disagreement may thus attenuate partisan motivated reasoning, but do so only in specific domains. Alternatively, perhaps the network batteries explored here do not capture the types of social interactions that matter. The name generator batteries used on the surveys tend to capture close ties, although a fair proportion of reported discussants nevertheless stem from ‘weak’ tie relations (Klofstad, McClurg, and Rolfe 2009). Notably, Mutz and Mondak (2006) show that discussion with weak ties found in the workplace were more effective in fostering political tolerance than was discussion with relatives, i.e. stronger ties. This fits with Klar’s (2014) study which focused on discussion between individuals that did not know each other and thus had little expectation of future interactions. Perhaps, then, we should look to discussions fostered outside of one’s peer networks, for instance on the internet, as a source of attenuation for partisan biases (Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009). However, on this last point we can note that incorporating indicators of discussion frequency and tie strength into our measure of network disagreement did not change our conclusions (see Online Appendix D). Regardless, one area for future work would be to theorize about potential conditionality for the influence of network disagreement and test it with appropriate data; to the extent that these conditional factors fail, then the first interpretation would gain influence over the latter. Whichever explanation ultimately finds support will have deep political, normative, and empirical implications for how we understand the nature and quality of public opinion.
References


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Does Social Disagreement Attenuate Partisan Motivated Reasoning?
A Test Case Concerning Economic Evaluations

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Online Appendices

1) Online Appendix A
   a) Measurement of Variables
   b) Table OA1: Economic Conditions
   c) Table OA2: Network Disagreement and Knowledge of the Budget Deficit
   d) Table OA3: Network Disagreement and Economic Evaluations (3pt Scales)
   e) Table OA4: Network Disagreement and Economic Evaluations (5pt Scales)
   f) Table OA5 & Figure OA1: Network Disagreement and Economic Evaluations in Fall 2008
   g) Figure OA2 & Tables OA6-OA9: Network Disagreement, Partisan Identity Extremity, and Partisan Ambivalence

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   a) Table OB1: Average Marginal Effect of Network Disagreement Across 3 Model Specifications
   b) Tables/Figures OB2-OB5: Predicted Knowledge Across 3 Model Specifications
   c) Tables/Figures: OB6-OB11: Predicted Economic Evaluations Across 3 Model Specifications

3) Online Appendix C: Influence of Control Variables, Partisan Matches, Leaners vs. Independents
   a) Table OC1: Non-Classifiable Response Options Across Surveys
   b) Table OC2: Characteristics of ‘Missing’ Discussants
   c) Tables OC3-13 / Figures OC1-OC10: The Muted Consequences of Focusing Just on Partisan Dyads
   d) Tables OC14-OC17 / Figures OC11-OC16: Leaning Partisan Discussants as Partisans vs as Independents

4) Online Appendix D: Analyses using Network Disagreement measures corrected for network size, and weighted by frequency of discussion, discussant interest/knowledge, discussant closeness, and general levels of disagreement

5) Online Appendix D: Matching Analyses
Online Appendix OA

Measurement of Variables

1) Network Disagreement: Agreeable/Disagreeable Coding [See Online Appendices B & C for further discussions]
   a) 1992 CNEP
      i) “Which candidate do you think [name of discussant] supported in the Presidential election this year?
      ii) Options: Bush, Clinton, Perot, Other, None, DK, Refused
          (1) A couple of respondents indicated both Perot and another major-party candidate and were treated as a third-party preference
      iii) Agreeable: Bush/Bush, Clinton/Clinton, Perot/Perot
      iv) Disagreeable: Bush/Clinton, Bush/Perot, Bush/Other, Clinton/Perot, Clinton/Other, Perot/Bush, Perot/Clinton, Perot/Other
          (1) None, DK, and Refused were thus dropped
   b) 2000 ANES/2002 ANES
      i) “How do you think [fill name 1] voted in the election?”
      ii) Options: Gore, Bush, Some Other Candidate, Didn’t Vote, Ineligible to Vote, DK, Refused
          (1) Respondent vote choice was more finely measured, including options for Howard Phillips (n=1), the candidate from the Libertarian party (n=4), Pat Buchanan (n=3), and Ralph Nader (n=33).
      iii) Agreeable: Gore/Gore, Bush/Bush
   c) 2006 ANES Pilot and 2008-2009 ANES Panel
      i) Discussant partisanship was measured via a branching format:
          (1) Generally speaking, does [PERSON] probably think of [himself/herself] as a [Democrat, Republican/Republican, Democrat], Independent or What?”
          (2) [If Dem or Rep]: “Would [he/she] call [himself/herself] a strong [Democrat / Republican] or a not very strong [Democrat / Republican].”
          (3) [If not]: “Does [he/she] think of [himself/herself] as closer to the Democratic Party or Republican Party?”
      ii) Options:
          (1) 7-pt scale from strong Dem to Str. Rep, Other, Pure Independent, and DK/Refused
          iii) Agreeable = Same Party (D/D; R/R)
          iv) Disagreeable = Different Party (D/R, D/I, R/D, and R/I)
              (1) Learners are counted as partisans for agreement/disagreement purposes

2) Network Size
   a) The number of discussants the respondent as asked about; it thus ranges from 1 to 5 [1992], 1-4 [2000/2002], and 1-3 [2006, 2008-2009].

3) Network Sophistication
a) For 1992, 2000, and 2002 network sophistication is the average of the perceived degree of political knowledge for discussion partners.
   i) 1992/2000/2002: Respondents were asked how much each discussant knew about politics; 1 = Not Much, 2 = Average Amount, 3 = Great Deal.
   ii) Network Average (1992): 2.20 (0.41)
   iii) Network Average (2000): 2.26 (0.51)

b) For 2006 and 2008-2009, it is the average of perceived discussant interest in politics.

4) Political Interest
   a) General political interest was not asked about on the 1992 CNEP. Instead, ‘news attention’ is a measure taken from a factor analysis (M=0, SD=1) of the respondent’s interest in the campaign and their level of attention to campaign news in newspaper and TV coverage.
   b) 2000, 2002, and 2006 ANES: Question pertains to how much of the time the respondent follows politics; 1 = “hardly at all”, 2 “only now and then”, 3 = “some of the time”, 4 = “most of the time”
   c) On the 2008-2009 ANES Panel interest is measured….
      i) How interested in news about politics: 1 = not interested, 2 = slightly, 3 = moderately, 4 = very, 5 = extremely
      ii) For the partisan extremity and knowledge analyses, interest comes from Wave 1 (January 2008). For the economic assessments analyses interest comes from W9 (September). This is done because there are two cohorts in the panel; one that completed the Panel from January onward and another that entered in mid-summer; thus, using W1 interest in the latter case would cut the model size (and precision of our estimates) substantially. The two variables are strongly correlated (r=0.67).

5) Education
   a) 1 = < HS, 2 = HS, 3 + Some College, 4 = College +
   b) For the ANES 2002 and 2006 analyses, the education variable comes from the prior survey (i.e. 2000 for 2002, 2004 for 2006).

6) Age
   a) Continuous variable; 18-90s
   b) For the ANES 2002 and 2006 analyses, the age variable comes from the prior survey (i.e. 2000 for 2002, 2004 for 2006).

7) Income
   a) 1992: Range: 1-5: 1= <15,000; 2= 15-24,999; 3 =25-34,999; 4=50,000-74,999; 5=75,000+
   b) 2000: Range: 1-22; 1 = <4,999; 22 = 200,000+
   c) 2002: Range: 1-7; 1 = <14,999; 7 = 84,999+
   d) 2006: Range: 1-23; 1 = < 2,999; 23 = 120,000+
   e) 2008-2009: Range: 1-19; 1 = < 5,000; 19 = 175,000+

8) Gender
   a) 1 = Female, 0 = Male

9) Race
   a) 1992, 2000, & 2006: 1 = White, 2 = Black, 3 = Other

Online Appendix A
b) Remainder of Surveys: 1 = White, 2 = Black, 3 = Hispanic, 4 = Other

10) Marital Status
   a) Dummy variable: 1 = Married, 0 = Unmarried

11) Occupation
   a) 1 = Employed; 2 = Unemployed; 3 = Retired; 4 = Other (Student, homemaker, permanent disabled)

12) Need for Cognition and Need to Evaluate
   a) These items are only available for the 2000/2002 ANES, 2006 ANES, and 2008-2009 ANES analyses. In these cases, the variables were measured on the 2000 pre-election wave of the 2000 ANES, the 2004 ANES Time Series, and the November 2011 wave of the 2008-2009 ANES Panel.
   b) Need for cognition is the sum of two measures: (1) whether the respondent prefers simple (=0) or complex (=1) problems and (2) whether they like or dislike having “responsibility for handling situations that require a lot of thinking” (1 = dislike a lot, 5 = like a lot). The latter item was placed on a 0-1 scale before being added to the binary simple/complex measure. The resulting scale thus ranges from 0-2 with higher scores indicating greater need for cognition.
   c) Need to evaluate is the sum of two items: (1) subjective absolute opinionation (“would you say you have opinions about [very few things, some things, many things, almost everything]”) and (2) relative subjective opinionation (“compared to the average person do you have fewer opinions about whether things are good or bad, about the same, or more opinions” with subsequent follow up question for whether the respondent has a lot more/fewer or somewhat more/fewer). Both items were scaled 0-1 and then summed, with higher scores on this variable indicate a greater need to evaluate.
Table OA1: Economic Conditions During Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployment Rate (Δ from Ref Point) (^a)</th>
<th>Consumer Sentiment (Δ From Ref Point) (^b)</th>
<th>Quarterly GDP Growth (During Ref Point) (^c)</th>
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<td>7.4</td>
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<td>(1.1)</td>
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<td>(3.1)</td>
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<td>2000 ANES</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>107.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.5)</td>
<td>(19.1)</td>
<td>(4.1)</td>
</tr>
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<td>2002 ANES Panel</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>(0.4)</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(1.1)</td>
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<td>(-0.4)</td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
<td>(2.3)</td>
</tr>
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<td>2008-9 ANES PanelMay 2009</td>
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<td>68.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.0)</td>
<td>(8.9)</td>
<td>(-5.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
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<td>66.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.7)</td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
<td>(-5.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

\(^a\) The unemployment rate is the unemployment rate during the month of interviewing for surveys completed during a month time span (2000 ANES, 2002 ANES, and the 2008-9 ANES surveys) or averaged across the months of fielding for other surveys (1992 CNEP: November, December, and January; 2006 ANES: November & December). The parenthetical tracks the change in unemployment relative to the reference point asked about in the retrospective assessment. For the 1992 CNEP, for instance, this compares Fall 1992 to 1990, for the 2000 ANES the comparison is the Fall of 1992, for the 2002 ANES it is November 2001, etc. Positive numbers indicate worse unemployment during the survey.

\(^b\) Higher values indicate greater consumer confidence/growths in consumer confidence.

\(^c\) GDP growth is for the quarter of the survey (typically the 4\(^{th}\) quarter), while the parenthetical indicates the level of GDP growth during the quarter of the reference point in the assessment question.

### Table OA2. Network Disagreement and Deficit Knowledge (Figure 1)

<table>
<thead>
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<td>1.527**</td>
<td>-1.112**</td>
<td>-1.059**</td>
<td>-1.581**</td>
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<td>-0.991**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.314)</td>
<td>(0.417)</td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
<td>(0.323)</td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.227*</td>
<td>0.184 (0.142)</td>
<td>0.0260 (0.0567)</td>
<td>-0.0172 (0.109)</td>
<td>0.122* (0.0729)</td>
<td>-0.0918 (0.141)</td>
<td>-0.0974 (0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan * Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0847 (0.204)</td>
<td>0.0610 (0.135)</td>
<td>0.296* (0.161)</td>
<td>0.345* (0.168)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Network Size</td>
<td>-0.0337 (0.147)</td>
<td>-0.0342 (0.147)</td>
<td>0.397* (0.206)</td>
<td>0.394* (0.204)</td>
<td>-0.728* (0.298)</td>
<td>-0.708* (0.284)</td>
<td>-0.868** (0.303)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Sophistication</td>
<td>-0.888* (0.400)</td>
<td>-0.883* (0.400)</td>
<td>-0.0630 (0.131)</td>
<td>-0.0633 (0.132)</td>
<td>-0.257* (0.145)</td>
<td>-0.267* (0.145)</td>
<td>-0.275* (0.148)</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses
Analyses are weighted: V000002a, WGTPP17, WGTPP19
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$
Table OA3. Network Disagreement & Economic Evaluations (Figure 2)

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Standard errors in parentheses
ANES results are weighted.
* $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$
### Table OA4. Network Disagreement & Economic Evaluations

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### Online Appendix A

**Need to Evaluate**

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**Observations**: 369 369 549 549 1446 1445 1352 1352

**Pseudo R²**: 0.159 0.130 0.073 0.059 0.041 0.035 0.080 0.069

**AIC**: 347.1 695.6 904.4 1218.3 2653.3 3709.0 2202.0 3248.7

**BIC**: 425.4 781.6 994.8 1317.4 2764.1 3830.3 2311.4 3368.5

Standard errors in parentheses
ANES results are weighted.

* p < 0.10,  * p < .05,  ** p < 0.01
### Table OA5. Network Disagreement and Economic Assessments - Fall 2008

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Number of Listed Discussants
-0.0227 (0.0764) -0.0225 (0.0769) -0.113 (0.0727) -0.131* (0.0701)

Network Pol. Interest
0.0585 (0.200) 0.0580 (0.201) -0.319 (0.195) -0.307 (0.192)

Pol. Interest (W9)
-0.133 (0.270) -0.136 (0.275) -0.0424 (0.234) -0.0197 (0.228)

Age
-0.00685 (0.0134) -0.00692 (0.0133) -0.0281* (0.0115) -0.0273* (0.0116)

Education
-0.142 (0.189) -0.148 (0.186) -0.134 (0.182) -0.138 (0.186)

Income
-0.0673 (0.0502) -0.0676 (0.0505) -0.0450 (0.0463) -0.0396 (0.0469)

Female
0.00861 (0.313) 0.000568 (0.323) 0.117 (0.308) 0.162 (0.307)

Unemployed
0.385 (0.734) 0.401 (0.737) 0.443 (0.640) 0.458 (0.624)

Retired
0.450 (0.408) 0.452 (0.406) 0.130 (0.480) 0.119 (0.491)

Disabled/Not Working/Other
-0.111 (0.626) -0.117 (0.623) 0.422 (0.434) 0.467 (0.439)

Black
-0.342 (0.755) -0.201 (0.778) 0.701 (0.535) 0.456 (0.531)

Hispanic
0.682 (0.632) 0.684 (0.632) 1.060* (0.575) 1.008* (0.556)

Other
-2.340* (1.104) -2.409* (1.142) -2.307* (1.141) -2.114* (1.122)
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Standard errors in parentheses
ANES results are weighted: WGTL10 & WGTL11
+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < 0.01$
**Figure OA1**: Network Disagreement and Partisanship in November 2008

**Notes**: Markers provide the predicted probability of a response of “worse” across level of network disagreement with separate lines for in-partisans (Republicans) and out-partisans (Democrats).
Partisan Identity Analyses

A key link potentially connecting network disagreement and the attenuation of partisan motivated reasoning is identity strength. Partisans in more disagreeable contexts may evince weaker identities and possess weaker motivations to counter-argue incongruent information. Coupled this weakened motivation with the potential provision of more incongruent information via disagreeable peers and we might thus expect to see reduced ‘biases’ in subsequent economic perceptions.

Here we explore two measures to test this argument. The first measure we explore is Partisan Extremity, which ranges from 1 (Pure Independent) to 4 (Strong Partisan); thus, H1 implies a negative coefficient for disagreement in predicting this measure. We will examine partisan extremity scores for all surveys save the 2000 ANES Time Series. Second, we use data from the November 2008 wave of the 2008-2009 ANES Panel to explore Partisan Ambivalence. Respondents were asked to indicate how favorable and how unfavorable were their “thoughts and feelings” toward the two parties. We will thus look at four variables: in-party favorability (i.e. Democratic respondent’s evaluations of the Democratic Party), out-party favorability, and in- and out-party unfavourability. Increasing ambivalence would manifest in negative coefficients for in-party favorability and out-party unfavourability as these are identity-consistent considerations and/or positive coefficients for in-party unfavourability and out-party favorability as these are identity-inconsistent considerations.

We analyzed these measures using ordinal logit models with the demographic controls discussed earlier. Figure OA2 provides an overview of these results by plotting the coefficient for disagreement from each of these models; full results can be found in the subsequent tables. The results in Figure OA2 are consistent with the argument that network disagreement attenuate partisan identity strength. First, disagreement is estimated to have a negative relationship with partisan extremity with the resulting coefficient statistically significant in all cases save for the 2002 ANES Panel analyses. Second, the coefficient for disagreement is in the expected direction for all four measures of ambivalence, with only the coefficient for out-party unfavourability failing to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. As network disagreement increases partisans tend to report less extreme identities and also less favorable (more favorable) thoughts and feelings regarding the in-party (out-party). This association can be quite substantial. For instance, the average predicted probability of a respondent saying they were a “strong” partisan in July 2009 was nearly 42% greater among those at the 5% percentile of disagreement in September 2008 (0.56 [0.48, 0.65]), i.e. low levels of disagreement, than those at the 95th percentile of this measure (0.15 [0.09, 0.22]), i.e. high levels of disagreement. Tables OA8 & OA9 show, meanwhile, that this negative effect continues to manifest even while controlling for prior levels of identity extremity or ambivalence on the panel surveys, with the most precise results coming from the 2008-2009 ANES Panel where we have the largest sample sizes to work

25 In practice, the variable ranges from “leaning partisan” to “strong partisan” in the cross-sectional analyses (i.e. 1992 and 2006) as only partisans are investigated. However, in 2002 and 2008-2009 the full 1-4 scale is possible because the outcome variable was measured in a later wave and, thus, partisans in 2000 or September 2008 could report being an ‘independent’ later on.

26 Extremity, and partisan ambivalence, was assessed on the pre-election wave of the 2000 ANES Time Series, while network disagreement was measured on the post-election wave.

27 Lavine, Johnston, and Steenbergen 2012

28
with. Thus, Figure OA2 provides strong evidence that individuals in disagreeable networks report weaker and more ambivalent partisan identities both contemporaneously and later in time, which is critical because prior research shows that identity strength facilitates directional motivated reasoning.

**Figure OA2:** Network Disagreement and Partisan Identity Strength

![Graph showing network disagreement and partisan identity strength](image)

**Notes:** Markers provide the ordinal logit coefficient for network disagreement (with 95% confidence intervals) on partisan extremity and ambivalence. See Tables OA2 and OA3 for full model results. “Fav.” = “Favorable” and “Unfav.” = “Unfavorable”.

Online Appendix A
### Table OA6. Network Disagreement and Partisan Disagreement (OLOGIT)

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Standard errors in parentheses
OLOGIT Models. ANES Data is weighted: WT02PRE,V06P002, WGTC10, WGTC11, WGTC17, and WGTC19 respectively

*p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01
Table OA7. Network Disagreement and Partisan Ambivalence: 2008-2009 ANES Panel

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Standard errors in parentheses

OLOGIT Models. Data is weighted: WGTC11

$^* p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.01$
### Table OA8. Partisan Extremity and Network Disagreement - Controlling for Prior PID Extremity

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.828**</td>
<td>-0.582*</td>
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<td>-1.924*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(1.102)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.207*</td>
<td>(1.258)</td>
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<td>(1.150)</td>
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<td>(0.882)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>(1.120)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>(1.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0696</td>
<td>(1.185)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.280</td>
<td>(1.131)</td>
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</thead>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.051**</td>
<td>0.498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.915)</td>
<td>(1.277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.236**</td>
<td>(1.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.455*</td>
<td>(1.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.486*</td>
<td>(1.165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.505*</td>
<td>(1.113)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations    | 360               | 393              |
|                 | 758               | 758              |
|                 | 669               | 620              |
| Pseudo R²       | 0.209             | 0.208            |
|                 | 0.257             | 0.268            |
|                 | 0.267             | 0.264            |
| AIC             | 670.1             | 660.2            |
|                 | 1333.6            | 1273.5           |
|                 | 1183.0            | 1115.5           |
| BIC             | 747.9             | 735.7            |
|                 | 1426.2            | 1366.1           |
|                 | 1273.2            | 1204.1           |

Standard errors in parentheses

OLOGIT Models. Data is weighted: WT02PRE,V06P002, WGTC10, WGTC11, WGTC17, and WGTC19 respectively

* p < 0.10,  * p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.01
**Table OA9.** Network Disagreement and Partisan Ambivalence Controlling for W2 (Feb 2008)

Ambivalence: 2008-2009 ANES Panel

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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0327 (0.0621)</td>
<td>0.00652 (0.0459)</td>
<td>0.112* (0.0527)</td>
<td>0.112* (0.0524)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Party: Favorable (W2)</td>
<td>1.185** (0.140)</td>
<td>0.162 (0.121)</td>
<td>-0.272* (0.156)</td>
<td>0.181 (0.138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out_Party: Unfavorable (W2)</td>
<td>0.131 (0.107)</td>
<td>0.812** (0.139)</td>
<td>0.166 (0.114)</td>
<td>-0.192* (0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Party: Unfavorable (W2)</td>
<td>-0.235* (0.109)</td>
<td>0.174 (0.144)</td>
<td>1.013** (0.162)</td>
<td>0.127 (0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out_Party: Favorable (W2)</td>
<td>-0.0496 (0.128)</td>
<td>-0.363** (0.124)</td>
<td>0.187 (0.172)</td>
<td>0.987** (0.171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Disc. Asked About</td>
<td>-0.111 (0.275)</td>
<td>0.0352 (0.310)</td>
<td>-0.541* (0.287)</td>
<td>0.348 (0.296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Pol. Interest</td>
<td>0.0187 (0.133)</td>
<td>0.0931 (0.147)</td>
<td>0.0728 (0.176)</td>
<td>-0.201 (0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>0.400* (0.227)</td>
<td>-0.237 (0.216)</td>
<td>-0.781** (0.236)</td>
<td>0.0764 (0.245)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pol. Interest (W1)</td>
<td>0.419** (0.139)</td>
<td>0.378** (0.141)</td>
<td>0.125 (0.150)</td>
<td>-0.0838 (0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.199 (0.230)</td>
<td>-0.163 (0.208)</td>
<td>-0.0807 (0.243)</td>
<td>0.304 (0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.594 (0.440)</td>
<td>-0.571 (0.492)</td>
<td>-1.422* (0.570)</td>
<td>-1.642** (0.475)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-0.381 (0.390)</td>
<td>-0.777* (0.317)</td>
<td>-0.815 (0.578)</td>
<td>-0.0405 (0.378)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.479 (0.852)</td>
<td>2.918** (1.050)</td>
<td>1.184 (0.853)</td>
<td>-1.320* (0.738)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.0142* (0.00731)</td>
<td>-0.00474 (0.00597)</td>
<td>0.0148* (0.00830)</td>
<td>0.00592 (0.00778)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.0307 (0.107)</td>
<td>0.177 (0.177)</td>
<td>-0.0726 (0.177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cut1</td>
<td>cut2</td>
<td>cut3</td>
<td>cut4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>(0.00787)</td>
<td>0.0193</td>
<td>0.0157</td>
<td>0.0456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0338)</td>
<td>(0.0308)</td>
<td>(0.0334)</td>
<td>(0.0291)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.0457</td>
<td>-0.355</td>
<td>-0.685**</td>
<td>-0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to Evaluate</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.754**</td>
<td>0.487</td>
<td>0.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.311)</td>
<td>(0.287)</td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
<td>(0.295)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Cognition</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
<td>-0.282*</td>
<td>0.0120</td>
<td>-0.00251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut1 Constant</td>
<td>2.394*</td>
<td>3.208**</td>
<td>1.743</td>
<td>2.929**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.157)</td>
<td>(1.229)</td>
<td>(1.164)</td>
<td>(0.987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut2 Constant</td>
<td>2.963*</td>
<td>3.740**</td>
<td>3.099**</td>
<td>4.190**</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.162)</td>
<td>(1.222)</td>
<td>(1.190)</td>
<td>(1.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut3 Constant</td>
<td>5.260**</td>
<td>5.407**</td>
<td>5.445**</td>
<td>6.915**</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.192)</td>
<td>(1.237)</td>
<td>(1.254)</td>
<td>(1.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut4 Constant</td>
<td>7.423**</td>
<td>7.299**</td>
<td>6.644**</td>
<td>9.384**</td>
</tr>
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<td>(1.258)</td>
<td>(1.260)</td>
<td>(1.384)</td>
<td>(1.303)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>746</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>749</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1709.5</td>
<td>1788.8</td>
<td>1351.4</td>
<td>1278.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1815.8</td>
<td>1894.9</td>
<td>1455.4</td>
<td>1384.3</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses
OLOGIT Models. Data is weighted: WGTC11
* $p < 0.10$,  ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Online Appendix B

One thorny issue with exploring the role of social network composition on political behavior is that of self-selection into networks with a particular composition. We attempt to address such concerns as best we can in text with analyses that control for some of the factors that may drive this self-selection. However, some of our variables may be reciprocally related to network composition; political interest, for instance, may both drive exposure to social discussions about politics as well as be influenced by it as well (e.g., Huckfeldt and Mendez 2008). The use of variables such as political interest, need for cognition, and perhaps even marital status (Huber and Malhotra 2017), may thus create post-treatment biases that may undermine the validity of our estimates (Montgomery, Nyhan, and Torres 2016).

In the present appendix we address this concern. Specifically, we replicated our analyses across three model specifications to assess how much influence the inclusion of these control variables has on our estimates. We explicitly compare three models:

- Model 1: Only network disagreement, partisanship, and their interaction as predictor variables
- Model 2: the above + demographic variables that should be (reasonably) exogenous to disagreement and partisanship (age, education, income, gender, and race)
- Model 3: the above + control variables that may be influenced by disagreement and partisanship (political interest/news attention; need for cognition; need to evaluate; network size; network sophistication; and marital status).

Table OB1 below provides an overview of these results by providing the average marginal effect of network disagreement on the probability of a correct response (knowledge analyses) or on the probability of saying the economy is “better” separately for in- and out-partisans. The remainder of the figures and tables below, meanwhile, replicate the analyses done in text and focus on the predicted probability of these responses by partisanship and network disagreement across the three models. The key result here is that model specification does not change the substantive story reported in text. All three models yield substantively similar estimates and patterns with estimates generally varying little more than a rounding error. Moreover, estimates from Models 2 and 3 are virtually indistinguishable from each other. While these analyses do not obviate concerns about observational analyses using network data, they do suggest that our results are not an artifact of the use of particular control variables or even any control variables at all.
Table OB1: Comparing the Effect of Network Disagreement by Partisanship Across the Three Models – An Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>In Partisans</th>
<th>Out Partisans</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000 ANES</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.01, 0.08]</td>
<td>[-0.01, 0.08]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.01, 0.04]</td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.03]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.03, 0.09]</td>
<td>[0.02, 0.07]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Incor. In May)</td>
<td>[0.04, 0.10]</td>
<td>[0.03, 0.09]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retro Evals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 CNEP</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.03, -0.005]</td>
<td>[-0.03, -0.005]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 ANES</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.01, 0.04]</td>
<td>[-0.004, 0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 ANES</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.00009</td>
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<tr>
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<td>[-0.03, 0.03]</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006 ANES</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
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<tr>
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<td>[-0.08, -0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.03, 0.01]</td>
<td>[-0.03, 0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.003]</td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.01]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Cells for “Knowledge” provide the average marginal effect of network disagreement on the probability of a correct response to the deficit item with 95% confidence intervals in brackets. Cells for “Retro Evals” provide the average marginal effect of network disagreement on the probability of saying the economy is “better”, also with 95% confidence intervals.
Knowledge

Figure OB2: 2000 ANES Knowledge Analyses: Comparing Models

Table OB2. Disagreement and Deficit Knowledge, 2000 ANES: Comparing Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deficit Knowledge</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>0.949**</td>
<td>1.559**</td>
<td>1.527**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.362)</td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td>(0.417)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0329</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>0.0847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.182)</td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.611**</td>
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<td>-0.884</td>
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<td>(0.234)</td>
<td>(0.868)</td>
<td>(1.180)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>354</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$AIC$</td>
<td>445.1</td>
<td>336.7</td>
<td>331.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$BIC$</td>
<td>461.2</td>
<td>375.5</td>
<td>393.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Predicted probabilities of a correct response by partisanship for each of three models

Standard errors in parentheses; $^* p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05, ^** p < 0.01$
Figure OB3: 2008-2009 (May) ANES Knowledge Analyses: Comparing Models

2009 ANES (May): Knowledge

![Graph](Image)

Notes: Predicted probabilities of a correct response by partisanship for each of three models

Table OB3. Disagreement and Deficit Knowledge, 2008-2009 (May) ANES: Comparing Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Model 1</th>
<th>(2) Model 2</th>
<th>(3) Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deficit Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>-1.337**</td>
<td>-1.056**</td>
<td>-1.059**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0123</td>
<td>-0.0344</td>
<td>-0.0172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
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<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0958</td>
<td>0.0590</td>
<td>0.0610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.384**</td>
<td>1.972*</td>
<td>1.218</td>
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<td>(0.228)</td>
<td>(0.766)</td>
<td>(0.968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>1454</td>
<td>1447</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1228.2</td>
<td>1153.2</td>
<td>1149.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1249.3</td>
<td>1211.3</td>
<td>1239.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Figure OB4: 2008-2009 (July) ANES Knowledge Analyses: Comparing Models

Notes: Predicted probabilities of a correct response by partisanship for each of three models

Table OB4. Disagreement and Deficit Knowledge, 2008-2009 (July) ANES: Comparing Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deficit Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>-1.468**</td>
<td>-1.243**</td>
<td>-1.263**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>(0.323)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0584</td>
<td>-0.0621</td>
<td>-0.0918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.351*</td>
<td>0.295*</td>
<td>0.296*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.652**</td>
<td>2.150**</td>
<td>4.115**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.280)</td>
<td>(0.807)</td>
<td>(1.198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>1353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1096.0</td>
<td>1024.0</td>
<td>1007.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1116.9</td>
<td>1081.4</td>
<td>1096.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Online Appendix B
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Figure OB5: 2008-2009 (July; Correct in May) Knowledge Analyses: Comparing Models

2009 ANES (July, Incorr in May): Knowledge

![Graph showing knowledge analyses for different models](image)

Notes: Predicted probabilities of a correct response by partisanship for each of three models

Table OB5. Disagreement and Deficit Knowledge, 2008-2009 (July, Controlling for May Knowl)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deficit Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>-1.129**</td>
<td>-1.011**</td>
<td>-0.991**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>(0.351)</td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0506</td>
<td>-0.0573</td>
<td>-0.0974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.373*</td>
<td>0.332*</td>
<td>0.345*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.201**</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>2.863*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
<td>(0.862)</td>
<td>(1.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>1353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.218</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1000.9</td>
<td>962.6</td>
<td>939.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1027.0</td>
<td>1025.2</td>
<td>1033.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Only May Knowl.</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Standard errors in parentheses; Analyses are weighted: WGTPP19; * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Economic Evaluations:
Figure OB6 1992 CNEP Retro. Evaluations: Comparing Models

Notes: Predicted probabilities of saying “better” across models and partisanship

Table OB6. Disagreement and Retro Evals, 1992 CNEP: Comparing Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Model 1</th>
<th>(2) Model 2</th>
<th>(3) Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective Assessments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>1.388**</td>
<td>1.347**</td>
<td>1.319**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.166)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0692</td>
<td>0.0608</td>
<td>0.0648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0594)</td>
<td>(0.0623)</td>
<td>(0.0638)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network</td>
<td>-0.197**</td>
<td>-0.195*</td>
<td>-0.186*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>(0.0747)</td>
<td>(0.0784)</td>
<td>(0.0803)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1400.0</td>
<td>1302.0</td>
<td>1248.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1423.8</td>
<td>1353.7</td>
<td>1332.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; Cut points omitted for space; * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Figure OB7: 2000 ANES Retro. Evaluations: Comparing Models

![Graph showing predicted probabilities of saying “better” across models and partisanship](image)

**Notes**: Predicted probabilities of saying “better” across models and partisanship

**Table OB7. Disagreement and Retro Evals, 2000 ANES: Comparing Models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Model 1</th>
<th>(2) Model 2</th>
<th>(3) Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy Change Since 1992 In-Partisan</td>
<td>1.494**</td>
<td>2.376**</td>
<td>2.564**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.341)</td>
<td>(0.436)</td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0921</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>-0.0551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.245*</td>
<td>0.357*</td>
<td>0.361*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.185)</td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>435.8</td>
<td>343.1</td>
<td>347.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>456.1</td>
<td>386.2</td>
<td>425.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Figure OB8: 2002 ANES Retro. Evaluations: Comparing Models

![Network Disagreement Graph](image)

Notes: Predicted probabilities of saying “better” across models and partisanship

Table OB8. Disagreement and Retro Evals, 2002 ANES: Comparing Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>-1.062**</td>
<td>-1.070**</td>
<td>-1.171**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0252</td>
<td>-0.0209</td>
<td>-0.00393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0770)</td>
<td>(0.0791)</td>
<td>(0.0805)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0356</td>
<td>0.0214</td>
<td>-0.0132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1090.4</td>
<td>1037.8</td>
<td>904.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1112.8</td>
<td>1090.8</td>
<td>994.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$,  * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$
**Figure OB9: 2006 ANES Retro. Evaluations: Comparing Models**

![Graph showing predicted probabilities of saying “better” across models and partisanship](image)

**Notes:** Predicted probabilities of saying “better” across models and partisanship

**Table OB9. Disagreement and Retro Eval, 2006 ANES: Comparing Models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Model 1</th>
<th>(2) Model 2</th>
<th>(3) Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>1.546(^{**})</td>
<td>1.389(^{**})</td>
<td>1.517(^{**})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0682</td>
<td>0.0372</td>
<td>-0.0230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0843)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.209(^*)</td>
<td>-0.231(^*)</td>
<td>-0.223(^*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>826.3</td>
<td>757.0</td>
<td>730.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>846.8</td>
<td>801.1</td>
<td>810.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; \(^*\) $p < 0.10$, \(^*\) $p < 0.05$, \(^{**}\) $p < 0.01$
Figure OB10: May 2009 ANES Panel Retro. Evaluations: Comparing Models

Notes: Predicted probabilities of saying “better” across models and partisanship

Table OB10. Disagreement and Retro Evals, May 2009: Comparing Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Model 1</th>
<th>(2) Model 2</th>
<th>(3) Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Econ Worse than Jan. 2009 (W17)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>0.662**</td>
<td>0.786**</td>
<td>0.802**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0415</td>
<td>0.0304</td>
<td>0.0342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0503)</td>
<td>(0.0504)</td>
<td>(0.0534)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>-0.0957</td>
<td>-0.0942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0734)</td>
<td>(0.0731)</td>
<td>(0.0746)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1461</td>
<td>1454</td>
<td>1446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>2722.0</td>
<td>2681.1</td>
<td>2653.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>2748.5</td>
<td>2744.5</td>
<td>2764.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.01$
Figure OB11: July 2009 ANES Panel Retro. Evaluations: Comparing Models

Notes: Predicted probabilities of saying “better” across models and partisanship

Table OB11. Disagreement and Retro Evals, July 2009: Comparing Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Model 1</th>
<th>(2) Model 2</th>
<th>(3) Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Econ Worse than Jan. 2009 (W19)? In-Partisan</td>
<td>1.151** (0.183)</td>
<td>1.156** (0.194)</td>
<td>1.157** (0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0904 (0.0677)</td>
<td>0.0919 (0.0692)</td>
<td>0.0988 (0.0696)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.167* (0.0853)</td>
<td>-0.139 (0.0878)</td>
<td>-0.136 (0.0863)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1367</td>
<td>1360</td>
<td>1352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>2253.5</td>
<td>2225.1</td>
<td>2202.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>2279.6</td>
<td>2287.7</td>
<td>2311.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Online Appendix C

We focus on the composition of partisans’ discussion networks and particularly the relative share of agreeable to disagreeable partners. In this appendix, we discuss the consequences of three coding decisions on our estimates: (1) the presence of dyads where the discussant partner’s preferences are unknown; (2) the inclusion of Independents and third-party supporters as disagreeable partners; and (3) the decision to code leaning partisan discussion partners as either partisans or Independents.

In Online Appendix A we provide an overview of how we coded agreeable and disagreeable partners across the surveys. One question may concern what we do with dyads wherein the respondent either does not know their discussion partner’s preference or does not report it. We necessarily drop these dyads because there is no information contained within the respondent’s report that would inform us about how to categorize this dyad. These respondents will still show up in our analyses, however, as the disagreement measure is simply the difference between the # Disagreeable and the # Agreeable.

Table OC1 provides an overview of how many dyad responses are of this type. The degree of missing observations is somewhat modest in most years (i.e. ~ 10% or less) except for the 2000 ANES where nearly double those numbers are unidentifiable.

First, we should consider potential correlates of ‘missingness’ to ascertain whether the absence of these respondents is likely to systematically affect our results. It seems plausible that a variety of factors are tied to reported ignorance of discussant preferences including: political agreement (i.e. more likely to not know when in disagreement); discussant political interest and sophistication (i.e. more likely to not know when the partner is less knowledgeable and thus sends a less clear signal); and discussion frequency and tie strength (i.e. more likely to not know when one does not discuss politics very often and thus does not receive the message). In Table OC2 we compare the mean scores for each discussant on these variables by whether the respondent reported political preference data (“Present”) or whether this data is not available (“Missing”). Of particular relevance here will be the 1992 CNEP and 2000 ANES comparisons as it is there that the most ‘missing’ respondents, and hence precise comparisons, can be found. Discussants with ‘missing’ preferences do indeed score lower on discussion frequency, knowledge/sophistication, and also tie strength, although the statistical precision of these comparisons varies both by measure (i.e. a bit more consistent on discussion frequency) and survey due to size issues. On the other hand, a measure of perceived ‘general’ disagreement about politics actually tends to show that discussants for whom there is preference data tend to be rated as slightly more disagreeable, although these differences are not generally significant.

What is the upshot of these analyses? On the one hand, they may mean that our analyses in-text slightly under-estimate the presence of disagreement within discussion networks, which may help undermine our ability to detect precise effects of disagreement. On the other hand, insofar as these partners are indeed characterized by lower levels of political expertise, discussion frequency, and tie strength, then we would expect their influence on respondent’s to be relatively minimal as well. Ultimately we believe that the latter portrait is more likely and that the influence of these missing discussants is likely to be minimal, although we acknowledge that we cannot know this with complete certainty.
A second potential question that may arise here concerns our decision in the original coding scheme to code non-major party voters and pairs where the discussant as an Independent. In the former case, our initial coding decision was to keep as many of these individuals in the data as possible, e.g. Perot/Perot dyads are coded as agreeable while Perot/Bush or Gore/Some Other Candidate pairs are coded as disagreeable. This may be questionable insofar as we care about partisans and partisan disagreement. In the former case, our models focus explicitly on partisans, so non-partisan Perot supporters will necessarily be dropped from the analysis. However, it may be the case that Perot-supporting Democrats or Republicans will be quite different from Clinton-supporting Democrats or Bush-supporting Republicans. In the latter case, it may be questionable whether a Bush/Perot or Republican/Independent dyad represents as much disagreement as a Bush/Clinton or Republican/Democrat dyad. To address these potential concerns we re-coded our disagreement measures to focus only on cases of major-party supporters (i.e. agreeable = Democratic party or candidate supporters / Democratic party or candidate supporters, etc.; disagreeable = Democratic party or candidate supporters / Republican party or candidate supporters, etc.). Our analyses are below. Table OC2 provides estimates of the marginal effect of disagreement among in- and out-partisans for both measures and thus provides a nice summary of the model results (although fuller explications are provided subsequently). The key result is that the exclusion of Independents and third-party supporters, and the exclusive focus on partisan dyads, is inconsequential; the same pattern of results emerges regardless.

A final question that may arise concerns how we code Independent leaners. Discussant partisanship on both the 2006 and 2008-2009 ANES was queried using a branching format that enabled respondents to differentiate between leaners and pure independents in their discussion networks. In-text we lump ‘leaners’ in with partisans; e.g., for Democratic respondents we code as agreeable ‘strong’ Democratic discussants, ‘weak’ Democratic discussants, and ‘leaner’ discussants. This matches how we code the respondent’s partisanship and would be consistent with a broader literature suggesting that ‘leaning’ partisans are in essence undercover partisans. We have also investigated the consequences of this decision and found that it likewise matters little for our conclusions.
### Table OC1: Non-Classifiable Response Options Across Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disc1</th>
<th>Disc2</th>
<th>Disc3</th>
<th>Disc4</th>
<th>Disc5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1992 CNEP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/Refused</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Cand. Pref (&quot;None&quot;)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Obs =</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>614</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DK/Refused</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Some Other Candidate&quot;</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn’t Vote</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineligible to Vote</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td># Obs</td>
<td>1152</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>327</td>
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<td><strong>2002 ANES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>DK/Refused</td>
<td>[Not listed]</td>
<td>[Not listed]</td>
<td>[Not listed]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Some Other Candidate&quot;</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn’t Vote</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineligible to Vote</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK/Ref.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td># Obs.</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>343</td>
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<td><strong>2008-2009 ANES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>---------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Obs.</td>
<td>2087</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Cell entries provide the number of observations for each potential response on the discussant political preference measure. “# observations” is the total number of observations for each dyad inclusive of these responses. The 2008-2009 ANES Panel does not directly give the missing data. Instead, for each discussant we took the difference people the number of respondents who answered the PID measure and the number who said they talked with someone about politics (and hence were eligible for the network battery) and gave at least as many names as the discussant number in question (e.g. 1+, 2+, and 3+) and hence were eligible for the PID measure for that discussant, but for whom no answer was provided.
### Table OC2: Characteristics of ‘Missing’ Discussants

#### 1992 CNEP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Knowledge/Interest</th>
<th>Disc. Freq</th>
<th>General Disagreement</th>
<th>Tie Closeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>T=</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>2.15 (0.06)</td>
<td>2.25 (0.02)</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>2.39 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>2.22 (0.07)</td>
<td>2.19 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>2.40 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>2.00 (0.07)</td>
<td>2.22 (0.03)</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>2.37 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4</td>
<td>2.02 (0.09)</td>
<td>2.19 (0.03)</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>2.00 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D5</td>
<td>2.11 (0.07)</td>
<td>2.28 (0.02)</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>2.64 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2000 ANES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Knowledge/Interest</th>
<th>Disc. Freq</th>
<th>General Disagreement</th>
<th>Tie Closeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>T=</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>2.10 (0.05)</td>
<td>2.39 (0.02)</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>1.97 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>1.98 (0.05)</td>
<td>2.29 (0.02)</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>1.75 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>1.97 (0.06)</td>
<td>2.28 (0.03)</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>1.73 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4</td>
<td>1.84 (0.08)</td>
<td>2.31 (0.04)</td>
<td>5.78</td>
<td>1.68 (0.08)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2006 ANES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Knowledge/Interest</th>
<th>Disc. Freq</th>
<th>General Disagreement</th>
<th>Tie Closeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>T=</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>3.00 (0.44)</td>
<td>3.72 (0.05)</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>4.00 (0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>3.4 (0.24)</td>
<td>3.54 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>4.2 (0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>3.4 (0.6)</td>
<td>3.46 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>3.6 (0.24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2008-2009 ANES Panel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Knowledge/Interest</th>
<th>Disc. Freq</th>
<th>General Disagreement</th>
<th>Tie Closeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>T=</td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D1</td>
<td>3.33 (0.88)</td>
<td>3.93 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>3.5 (0.5)</td>
<td>3.82 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>3.5 (0.67)</td>
<td>3.73 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Notes: Cells indicate mean scores with standard errors in parentheses. “D1” etc refer to Discussant 1 and so on. “Missing” = the respondent did not provide a political preference for the discussant, “Present” = they did. T = the t-statistic from a t-test of the two means. Higher values of the column variables indicate greater knowledge, disagreement, discussion frequency, and tie strength.
Indepedents as ‘Disagreeable’ vs. Only Partisan Pairs

Table OC3: The Muted Consequences of Focusing Just on Partisan Dyads

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>In Partisans</th>
<th>Out Partisans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Original</td>
<td>Just Partisans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 ANES</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.003, 0.08]</td>
<td>[-0.001, 0.08]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.03]</td>
<td>[-0.01, 0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.01, 0.06]</td>
<td>[0.01, 0.07]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009 (Control for May Knowl.)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.02, 0.08]</td>
<td>[0.02, 0.09]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retro Evals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 CNEP</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.03, -0.003]</td>
<td>[-0.03, 0.001]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 ANES</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.001, 0.05]</td>
<td>[-0.01, 0.05]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 ANES</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.04, 0.03]</td>
<td>[-0.04, 0.04]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 ANES</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.10, -0.02]</td>
<td>[-0.10, -0.02]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.03, 0.01]</td>
<td>[-0.03, 0.003]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.01]</td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.01]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Cell entries provide the average marginal effect of network disagreement on the probability of a correct response on the deficit question (top half) or the probability of saying the economy is “better” (bottom half) along with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
Figure OC1: 2000 Knowledge

![2000 ANES: Knowledge Graph](image)

Table OC4. Disagreement and Deficit Knowledge, 2000 ANES: Comparing Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Original</th>
<th>(2) Partisan Pairs Only</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deficit Knowledge</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>1.527**</td>
<td>1.665**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.417)</td>
<td>(0.445)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network Disagreement</strong></td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0847</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
<td>(0.216)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-0.884</td>
<td>-0.933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.180)</td>
<td>(1.207)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>354</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo R²</strong></td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.196</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AIC</strong></td>
<td>331.5</td>
<td>324.6</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BIC</strong></td>
<td>393.4</td>
<td>386.0</td>
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<td><strong>Controls?</strong></td>
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Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Figure OC2: May 2008 Knowledge
Table OC5. Disagreement and Knowledge, May 2009 ANES: Comparing Measures

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deficit Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>-1.059**</td>
<td>-0.993**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
<td>(0.297)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0172</td>
<td>-0.0347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.119)</td>
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<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0610</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>1421</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1149.3</td>
<td>1124.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1239.0</td>
<td>1213.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
$^*$ $p < 0.10$, $^*$ $p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$
Figure OC3: July 2009 Knowledge

Table OC6. Disagreement and Knowledge, July 2009 ANES: Comparing Measures

<table>
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<th>(2) Partisan Pairs Only</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deficit Knowledge</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>-1.263**</td>
<td>-1.282**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.323)</td>
<td>(0.399)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Network Disagreement</strong></td>
<td>-0.0918</td>
<td>-0.00199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.296*</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
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<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>4.115**</td>
<td>3.899**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.198)</td>
<td>(1.295)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>1353</td>
<td>1328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo R²</strong></td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.232</td>
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<td><strong>AIC</strong></td>
<td>1007.9</td>
<td>977.8</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BIC</strong></td>
<td>1096.5</td>
<td>1066.0</td>
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<td><strong>Controls?</strong></td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10,  * p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.01
Figure OC4: July 2009 Knowledge (Incorrect in May)

Table OC7. Disagreement and Knowledge, July 2009 ANES (Incor. in May): Comparing Measures

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deficit Knowledge</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>-0.991**</td>
<td>-1.020*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
<td>(0.404)</td>
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<td>-0.0974</td>
<td>-0.0111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.345*</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>2.863*</td>
<td>2.758*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.207)</td>
<td>(1.283)</td>
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<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>1353</td>
<td>1328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo R²</strong></td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIC</strong></td>
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<td>917.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BIC</strong></td>
<td>1033.4</td>
<td>1010.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
Analyses are weighted: V000002a

*p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01

Online Appendix C
Economic Evaluations

Figure OC5: 1992 CNEP – Economic Evaluations

2000 ANES: Evaluations

![Graph showing network disagreement vs. evaluations for out-partisan and in-partisan networks.]

Table OC8. Disagreement and Econ Evals, 1992 CNEP: Comparing Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Original</th>
<th>(2) Partisan Pairs Only</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective Assessments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>1.319**</td>
<td>1.226**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0648</td>
<td>0.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0638)</td>
<td>(0.0799)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.186*</td>
<td>-0.200*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0803)</td>
<td>(0.0999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1248.4</td>
<td>1054.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1332.0</td>
<td>1134.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Controls?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

Online Appendix C
Table OC9. Disagreement and Econ Evals, 2000 ANES: Comparing Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Original</th>
<th>(2) Partisan Pairs Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy Change Since 1992</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>2.564**</td>
<td>2.468**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
<td>(0.484)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0551</td>
<td>-0.0838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.361*</td>
<td>0.332*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.159</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>347.1</td>
<td>337.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>425.4</td>
<td>415.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$
Figure OC7: 2002 ANES – Economic Evaluations

Table OC10. Disagreement and Econ Evals, 2002 ANES: Comparing Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Original</th>
<th>Partisan Pairs Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retro (2002; 3-pt)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>-1.171**</td>
<td>-1.276**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.00393</td>
<td>0.0627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0805)</td>
<td>(0.0842)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0132</td>
<td>-0.0648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>904.4</td>
<td>859.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>994.8</td>
<td>949.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Figure OC8: 2006 ANES – Economic Evaluations
Table OC11. Disagreement and Econ Evals, 2002 ANES: Comparing Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Original</th>
<th>Partisan Pairs Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retrospective Economic Assessments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>1.517**</td>
<td>1.330**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0230</td>
<td>0.0434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.223*</td>
<td>-0.316*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>730.7</td>
<td>717.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>810.1</td>
<td>796.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$,  * $p < 0.05$,  ** $p < 0.01$

Figure OC9: 2008-9 ANES (May) – Economic Evaluations
Note: Predicted probability of "better"

Table OC12. Disagreement and Evaluations, May 2009 ANES: Comparing Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Original</th>
<th>(2) Partisan Pairs Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Econ Worse than Jan. 2009 (W17)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>0.802** (0.167)</td>
<td>0.696** (0.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0342 (0.0534)</td>
<td>0.0439 (0.0593)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0942 (0.0746)</td>
<td>-0.135* (0.0807)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1446</td>
<td>1420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$AIC$</td>
<td>2653.3</td>
<td>2587.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$BIC$</td>
<td>2764.1</td>
<td>2698.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure OC10: 2008-9 ANES (July) – Economic Evaluations
Note: Predicted probability of “better”

Table OC13. Disagreement and Evaluations, July 2009 ANES: Comparing Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Original</th>
<th>(2) Partisan Pairs Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Econ Worse than Jan. 2009 (W19)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>1.157**</td>
<td>1.153**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0988</td>
<td>0.0874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0696)</td>
<td>(0.0733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0863)</td>
<td>(0.0954)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>1327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>2202.0</td>
<td>2148.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>2311.4</td>
<td>2257.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Leaners as Partisans vs. Independents
Table OC14: Independent Leaners as Partisans (Original Analyses) vs. as Independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>In Partisans</th>
<th>Out Partisans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Original</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leaners as Partisans</td>
<td>Leaners as Independents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 2009</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.03]</td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.03]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 2009</strong></td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.01, 0.06]</td>
<td>[0.02, 0.06]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 2009 (Incor. In May)</strong></td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.02, 0.08]</td>
<td>[0.03, 0.08]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Retro Evals</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006 ANES</strong></td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.10, -0.02]</td>
<td>[-0.10, -0.03]</td>
<td>[-0.03, 0.02]</td>
<td>[-0.01, 0.03]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 2009</strong></td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.03, 0.01]</td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.01]</td>
<td>[-0.01, 0.01]</td>
<td>[-0.01, 0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 2009</strong></td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.01]</td>
<td>[-0.02, 0.01]</td>
<td>[-0.002, 0.01]</td>
<td>[-0.002, 0.01]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** Cell entries provide the average marginal effect of network disagreement on the probability of a correct response on the deficit question (top half) or the probability of saying the economy is “better” (bottom half) along with 95% confidence intervals in brackets.
Figure OC11: 2006 ANES, Economic Evaluations

![Figure OC11: 2006 ANES, Economic Evaluations](image)

**Note**: Predicted probability of “better”

Figure OC15: 2006 ANES, Economic Evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Leaners as Partisan</th>
<th>(2) Leaners as Ind.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>1.517**</td>
<td>1.596**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0230</td>
<td>0.00850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan # Network Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.223^*</td>
<td>-0.291^*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>730.7</td>
<td>728.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>810.1</td>
<td>807.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$
Figure OC12: 2008 (May) ANES, Knowledge
Figure OC13: 2008 (July) ANES, Knowledge

[Graph showing the relationship between disagreement and probability of correct responses for Out-Partisan and In-Partisan groups, with separate lines for Leaner as Ind. and Leaner as Partisan.]
Figure OC14  2008 (July; Incorrect in May) ANES, Knowledge

July 2008: Knowledge (Wrong in May)

Out-Partisan

In-Partisan

Pr(Correct)

Disagreement

Leaner as Ind.  Leaner as Partisan

Online Appendix C
### Table: OC16 2008-2009 ANES, Knowledge Analyses; Comparing Leaners as Partisans vs Independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May 2009 As Ind.</th>
<th>May 2009 As Partisan</th>
<th>July 2009 As Ind.</th>
<th>July 2009 As Partisan</th>
<th>July 2009 (Incorrect in May) As Ind.</th>
<th>July 2009 (Incorrect in May) As Partisan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>main</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>-1.104**</td>
<td>-1.059**</td>
<td>-1.339**</td>
<td>-1.263**</td>
<td>-1.077**</td>
<td>-0.991**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.277)</td>
<td>(0.288)</td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
<td>(0.323)</td>
<td>(0.310)</td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0260</td>
<td>-0.0172</td>
<td>-0.0718</td>
<td>-0.0918</td>
<td>-0.0857</td>
<td>-0.0974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan #</td>
<td>0.0156</td>
<td>0.0610</td>
<td>0.289*</td>
<td>0.296*</td>
<td>0.343*</td>
<td>0.345*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>0.0156</td>
<td>0.0610</td>
<td>0.289*</td>
<td>0.296*</td>
<td>0.343*</td>
<td>0.345*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.246</td>
<td>1.218</td>
<td>4.186**</td>
<td>4.115**</td>
<td>2.955*</td>
<td>2.863*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.968)</td>
<td>(0.968)</td>
<td>(1.198)</td>
<td>(1.198)</td>
<td>(1.212)</td>
<td>(1.207)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1447</td>
<td>1447</td>
<td>1353</td>
<td>1353</td>
<td>1353</td>
<td>1353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$AIC$</td>
<td>1149.3</td>
<td>1149.3</td>
<td>1004.5</td>
<td>1007.9</td>
<td>935.8</td>
<td>939.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$BIC$</td>
<td>1239.0</td>
<td>1239.0</td>
<td>1093.0</td>
<td>1096.5</td>
<td>1029.6</td>
<td>1033.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** “As Ind.” = Leaners counted as Independents; “As Partisan” = Leaners counted as partisans. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$,  ** $p < 0.05$,  *** $p < 0.01$
Figure OC15 2008 (May) ANES, Economic Evaluations

Note: Predicted probability of “better”
Figure 016: July Evaluations, Comparing Leaners as Partisans vs. Independents

Note: Predicted probability of "better"
### Table OC17. 2008 Panel - Econ Evals - Measures with and without leaners as independents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May 2009</th>
<th></th>
<th>July 2009</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As Ind.</td>
<td>As Partisan</td>
<td>As Ind.</td>
<td>As Partisan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>main</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>0.856**</td>
<td>0.802**</td>
<td>1.184**</td>
<td>1.157**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>0.00826</td>
<td>0.0342</td>
<td>0.0977</td>
<td>0.0988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0531)</td>
<td>(0.0534)</td>
<td>(0.0659)</td>
<td>(0.0696)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Partisan #</td>
<td>-0.0481</td>
<td>-0.0942</td>
<td>-0.151*</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>(0.0717)</td>
<td>(0.0746)</td>
<td>(0.0832)</td>
<td>(0.0863)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1446</td>
<td>1446</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>1352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>2655.1</td>
<td>2653.3</td>
<td>2201.0</td>
<td>2202.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>2765.9</td>
<td>2764.1</td>
<td>2310.4</td>
<td>2311.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

$^* p < 0.10, ^* p < 0.05, ^{**} p < 0.01$
Online Appendix D

In-text, our measure of network disagreement is calculated by the following question: \( D - A \). \( D \) indicates the # of disagreeable discussion partners (from 0-3, 0-4, and 0-5 depending on the survey), while \( A \) indicates the # of agreeable discussion partners. Here we explore various alternative specifications of this measure. In particular, we re-calculated this measure of disagreement but first weighted each dyad score by discussion frequency, discussant political sophistication, general disagreement, or tie closeness. We also investigate an unweighted measure which corrects for network size (i.e. \( \text{Disagreement} = \frac{D - A}{D + A} \)). See below for the specific wording of these measures and their availability across the surveys as well as descriptive statistics.

To create the weighted measures of network disagreement we follow the guidelines suggested by Lupton and Thornton (n.d.). For instance, we recalculated \( A \) as follows:

\[
A = \sum (a_i * s_i)
\]

Here \( a_i \) indicates whether discussant \( i \) agrees (=1) or disagrees (=0) with the respondent and \( s_i \) refers to the discussant characteristic in equation (i.e. discussion frequency). \( D \) is re-calculated the same way and Network Disagreement re-calculated by taking the difference between the weighted \( D \) and \( A \) measures. As with our original measure, scores < 0 indicate individuals within agreeable networks with the minimum value indicating all agreeable partners that score at the maximum of the relevant characteristic (frequency, etc.). Scores > 0 indicate that the network has more disagreeable than agreeable partners with the maximum indicating that all discussion partners disagree and score at the maximum of the relevant characteristic.

- **Discussion Frequency**
  - Discussion frequency was measured on all surveys except for the 2008-2009 ANES Panel.
  - 1992: Respondents were asked whether they discuss political matters often (4), sometimes (3), rarely (2), or never (1) with the named discussant. The resulting disagreement measure ranges from -19 to +16; Mean: -2.86 (7.78); Median: -4.
  - 2000/2002: Respondents were asked whether they discuss political matters often, sometimes, rarely, or never with each named discussant. We merged rarely and never due to the small numbers saying never. Thus, each dyad score for Disagreeable and Agreeable was multiplied by a three-point scale ranging from 1 (rarely/never) to 3 (often). The resulting network disagreement scale ranges from -12 to +10 (mean=-2.39 [3.62]; Median=-2).
  - 2006: Respondents were asked how many days over the past six months they had talked to each named discussant with scores ranging from 0 to 180. We used STATA’s “egen cut” function to create a five category variable from this continuous measure. The resulting disagreement measure ranges from -15 to +15; Mean: -3.89 (5.67); Median= -4

- **Discussant Sophistication**
  - Discussant sophistication was measured on all surveys.
  - 1992 CNEP: Respondents were asked how much they believed the discussant knew about politics (1=Not much; 2 = average amount; 3 = great deal). The
resulting disagreement measure ranges from -15 to +13; Mean: -2.16 (5.86); Median: -3.

- 2000 ANES: Respondents were asked for their perception of how much the discussant knew about politics (1=not much; 2=average amount; 3=a great deal). The resulting disagreement measure ranges from -12 to +12; Mean = -2.56 (3.97); Median = -3.
- 2006 ANES: Respondents were asked for their perception of the political interest level of their discussant on a scale from 1-5. The resulting disagreement measure ranges from -15 to +15; Mean: -4.36 (6.17); Median: -5.
- 2008-2009 ANES: Respondents were asked the same discussant interest measure as on the 2006 ANES Pilot. Mean: -3.58 (7.97); Median = -4; Range: -15 to +15

**General (Dis)agreement**

- For our calculation of A, we scaled this so that higher scores indicated greater agreement (i.e. high = “never” disagree); for our calculation of D, we scaled it so that higher scores indicated greater disagreement (i.e. high = “often”).
- 1992: Respondents were asked whether they disagreed with the discussant when discussing politics “often,” “sometimes”, “rarely” or “never”. Range: -17, +15; Mean: -1.96 (5.29); Median: -2
- 2006 ANES & 2008-2009: Respondents were asked how different their political views were from each discussant with the following response options: “not different at all”, “slightly different”, “moderately,” “very” and “extremely.”
  - 2006: Range: -15, +15; mean: -5.13 (6.27); Median: -5
  - 2008-2009: Range: -15, +15; mean: -4.7 (7.31); Median: -5

In addition to this weighted measure, we will also explore general disagreement by itself; this measure by averaging the level of subjective disagreement across named discussants.

- 1992: Range: 1-4; mean: 2.56, median = 2.67
- 2006: Range: 1-5; mean=2.38, median = 2.33
- 2008-2009: Range: 1-5; mean: 2.25 (0.79) ; median=2.33

**Tie Closeness**

- The 1992 and 2000 surveys asked about the nature of the respondent’s relationship with each discussant, specifically whether they were a relative, non-relative, or spouse (and, if non-relative, whether they were a co-worker or not). However, this does not necessarily tell us about the strength or closeness of the tie; while we may feel free to assume that spouses represent ‘strong’ ties, co-workers could presumably be strong or weak much as family members could as well. We thus restrict our attention the 2006 ANES and 2008-2009 ANES Panel surveys were respondents were asked to indicate how close each discussant is: “how close do you feel to (NAME)? Extremely, very, moderately, slightly, or not close at all?”
  - 2006: Range: -15, +15; Mean: -5.05 (6.96); Median: -5
  - 2008-2009: Range: -15, +15; Mean: -3.82 (8.17); Median: -5

Tables OD1-OD4 below provide a comparison between models using the original partisan disagreement measure and these alternatives. The measures have different scales and thus caution should be taken in comparing the coefficients to determine the relative magnitude of effects. Our interest is instead in the
overall pattern of results and, crucially, whether these alternative measurement schemes would yield different patterns. The varied results presented in these tables suggest not. While there is some variation at time in the precision of the estimates on display, the overall pattern of results is quite consistent: disagreement is associated with reduced partisan extremity, increased partisan ambivalence, some diminution in the knowledge gap in July 2009, and meager evidence of diminished partisan differences in evaluation outside of the 1992 CENP survey.
### Table OD1: Partisan Extremity

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Table OD2: Partisan Ambivalence

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Table OD3: Knowledge

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<td>-0.544* (0.234)</td>
<td>-0.0434* (0.0227)</td>
<td>-0.0539* (0.0300)</td>
<td>-0.0784* (0.0311)</td>
<td>-0.453* (0.250)</td>
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<td>N=</td>
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<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.097</td>
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<td><strong>2000 ANES</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>2.564** (0.462)</td>
<td>2.683** (0.539)</td>
<td>2.563** (0.448)</td>
<td>2.397** (0.451)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.0551 (0.134)</td>
<td>-0.0313 (0.266)</td>
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<td>Partisan*Disagreement</td>
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<td>0.0981 (0.0779)</td>
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<td>In-Partisan</td>
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<td>1.538**</td>
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Online Appendix D
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**2008-2009 ANES: May 2009**

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<td>0.817**</td>
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**2008-2009 ANES: July 2009**

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<th>(0.306)</th>
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<tr>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>1.157**</td>
<td>1.159**</td>
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<td>0.0351*</td>
<td>0.355*</td>
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<td>Partisan*Disagreement</td>
<td>-0.136</td>
<td>-0.397*</td>
<td>-0.0534*</td>
<td>-0.0469*</td>
<td>-0.0496*</td>
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Online Appendix E

Individuals select, to some extent, whom they discuss politics with and, thus, exposure to interpersonal disagreement is not an exogenous factor. While Sinclair (2012) provides evidence that individuals typically construct their social network on the basis of shared social characteristics (e.g. gender, race) rather than partisanship, it may nevertheless be the case that individuals exposed to high levels of disagreement are characteristically different from those that receive a low dosage of this treatment (e.g. Gerber et al. 2012; Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013). This raises a potential issue for making inferences regarding the relationship between disagreement and partisan biases insofar as characteristics correlated with motivated reasoning and partisan bias on their own, and hence economic perceptions, also influence exposure to disagreement.

One method for ameliorating some, but definitely not all, of the concerns over selective exposure is to use a matching process to prune our data and thereby enable a more precise comparison of the effects of disagreement (as in: Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013; Parsons 2010). In this appendix we report our procedures for doing so. We focus on the four ANES surveys because in each case we possess data from a survey conducted prior to the one wherein disagreement was measured (Klofstad, Sokhey, and McClurg 2013): for the 2000 and 2002 ANES data, this prior survey was the pre-election wave of the 2000 ANES; for the 2006 ANES Pilot survey prior data comes from the 2004 ANES as respondents on the pilot also completed that survey; and for the 2008-2009 ANES Panel it comes from earlier waves (those conducted in January and February of 2008 and thus eight-nine months prior to the collection of the disagreement measures). This enables us to obtain some measurement distance between attitudinal measures used to predict disagreement and disagreement.

For all four ANES surveys we first created a new binary measure of disagreement by splitting the original measure at its median value, thereby sorting respondents into “low” and “high” levels of exposure to disagreement. We then used the ebalance package in STATA to submit this variable to an entropy balancing process to create treated (high disagreement) and control (low disagreement) groups with high levels of covariate balance between the two groups (Hainmueller 2012; Hainmueller and Xu 2013). We then re-ran our analyses using the analytical weight produced from this process.

Below is information regarding how many individuals were sorted into high and low disagreement groups as well as the variables used in the entropy balancing process as well as descriptions of the year by year results. With regards to partisanship, the estimated effect of disagreement continues to be negative after the balancing process, which takes into account prior levels of partisan extremity and ambivalence, but only in the 2008-2009 waves does this effect remain statistically significant. This may stem from the larger sample size in this survey. Meanwhile, the matching process does not yield an estimated effect of disagreement that is any clearer than what is presented in text; there is, in other words, scant evidence that disagreement meaningfully attenuates partisan differences in economic perceptions after disagreement exposure is balanced for covariates likely associated with motivated reasoning.

Online Appendix D
1. 2000
   a. n = 283 (High), n = 369 (Low)
   b. Variables used in the matching process: need for cognition; need to evaluate; partisan extremity; ideology; the number of identity consistent & inconsistent thoughts regarding the parties (see, e.g. Lavine et al. 2012); general political interest; interest in the campaign; political knowledge; gender; race; age; education; and marital status
   c. Table OE1 explores deficit knowledge and economic evaluations via logit/ordinal logit models in which disagreement, partisanship, and their interaction are the predictors and the models. Results are broadly as they were in-text. Disagreement does not appear to influence either the knowledge level or evaluation of members of the out-party. Among in-partisans, disagreement has a positive effect on knowledge (b=0.14 [-0.01, 0.29] and a positive effect on economic evaluations (e.g., the marginal effect of disagreement on the probability of saying ‘better’ for in-partisans was 0.12 [-0.01, 0.26]). Thus, while the estimates are noisy, they lead to conclusions much as in-text: disagreement appears to be further polarizing perceptions on this survey rather than attenuating them.

2. 2002
   a. n = 202 (High), n = 295 (Low)
   b. Variables used in the matching process: need for cognition (measured in 2000); need to evaluate (measured in 2000); partisan extremity (measured in 2000); ideology (measured in 2000); political knowledge (measured in 2000); political interest (measured in 2000); campaign interest (measured in 2000); gender; race; age; education; and marital status
   c. Table OE2 provides the results. Disagreement in 200 is negatively related to partisanship strength two years later, but the effect is statistically insignificant after the high and low disagreement have been balanced on 2000 levels of partisan extremity and ambivalence. Meanwhile, disagreement does not appear to attenuate the partisan gap in economic evaluations. This stems in part from the estimated positive (but noisy) influence of disagreement on evaluations among both in-partisans (b = 0.12 [-0.06, 0.30]) and out-partisans (b=0.14 [-0.04, 0.31]). These latter results deviate from in-text analysis in one aspect (i.e. estimating a positive effect rather than what was essentially a flat line) but still converge on the claim that disagreement does not appear to be clearly influencing economic evaluations.

3. 2006
   a. n = 131 (High), n = 194 (Low)

---

29 The 2000 and 2002 tallies differ because not all respondents completed both panel waves.
b. Variable used in matching process: need for cognition, need to evaluate, partisan extremity, ideology, political knowledge, political interest, gender, race, age, education, and marital status [all measured in 2004].

c. Table OE3 provides the results below. As in text disagreement has a negative effect on partisan extremity, although the results here are statistically insignificant. Meanwhile, disagreement does not appear to be either positively affecting economic evaluations among out-partisans (indeed the coefficient here is negative) or diminishing the gap in evaluations between partisans. Indeed, disagreement is associated (albeit quite nosily) with more pessimistic evaluations among bth out-partisans \(b = -0.06, -0.18, 0.05\) and in-partisans \(b = -0.02 [-0.24, 0.19]\). Much as in text, there is scant evidence that disagreement attenuates partisan differences in economic perceptions.

4. 2008

a. Overall: \(n = 703\) (High), \(n = 793\) (Low); However, this number includes individuals recruited into the panel later in the survey and thus unavailable to provide answers to answers earlier on the survey used to predict disagreement below. The disagreement split for those respondents that completed both W1 and W2 of the panel is: \(n = 324\) (High), \(n = 375\) (Low)

b. Variables used in the matching process: need for cognition; # identity consistent & conflicting partisan considerations (Lavine et al. 2012); need to evaluate; partisan extremity; ideology; political interest; gender; race; education; marital status; and political knowledge. All attitudinal items were asked in Wave 1 or 2 (January or February 2008) of the survey with disagreement measured in September, with the exceptions of need for cognition and evaluate which were measured in November.

c. Tables OC4 and OC5 provide the results for partisan extremity and partisan ambivalence. Disagreement measured in September 2008 continues to be associated with less extreme partisan identities in OctODer, November, May 2009, and July 2009 much as in text, even after balancing the treatment groups in terms of January/February partisan extremity and ambivalence. The ambivalence results also mostly point in the same direction as the in-text analyses, although the precision of the estimates has dropped and the estimates are now statistically insignificant.

d. Table OE6 provides the results for knowledge and economic evaluations. Much as with the in-text results, there is scant evidence that disagreement influenced knowledge for either in or out-partisans in May2009 (Out-Partisans: \(b = 0.03 [-0.06, 0.12]\); In-Partisans: \(b = -0.02 [-0.13, 0.08]\)). On the other hand, and contrary to the analyses in-text, disagreement appears to have a negative influence on knowledge in July 2009 among in-partisans \(b = -0.11 [-0.21, -0.02]\), while barely budging out-partisans \(b
= 0.02 [-0.5, 0.09]). With regards to the economic evaluations, in-partisans report significantly more positive evaluations in both May and July 2009, but in neither case does disagreement attenuate this gap as it does not have a significant effect among either in- or out-partisans in these waves.
### Table OE1. 2000 ANES - Entropy Balancing Results

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<tr>
<td>High Disagreement</td>
<td>0.107 (0.394)</td>
<td>0.0858 (0.384)</td>
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<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>0.181 (0.412)</td>
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<td>High Disagreement # In-Partisan</td>
<td>0.799 (0.612)</td>
<td>1.123 (0.729)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>0.784** (0.258)</td>
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| **cut1**                 |                        |                 |
| Constant                 | -2.736** (0.384)        |                 |

| **cut2**                 |                        |                 |
| Constant                 | -0.886** (0.273)        |                 |

| **cut3**                 |                        |                 |
| Constant                 | 0.616** (0.199)         |                 |

Observations: 302

Standard errors in parentheses
* \( p < 0.10 \), * \( p < 0.05 \), ** \( p < 0.01 \)

### Table OE2. 2002 ANES - Entropy Balancing Results

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<td>High Disagreement # In-Partisan</td>
<td>-0.00489 (0.570)</td>
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| **cut1**                 |                        |                 |
| Constant                 | -3.005** (0.357)        | -2.037** (0.246) |

| **cut2**                 |                        |                 |
| Constant                 | -0.789** (0.217)        | 0.119 (0.232)   |

| **cut3**                 |                        |                 |
| Constant                 | 0.616** (0.199)         |                 |
Observations  

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Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$,  
* $p < 0.05$,  
** $p < 0.01$

**Table OE3.** 2006 ANES - Entropy Balancing Results

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<td>High Disagreement</td>
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<td>-0.456 ** (0.396)</td>
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<td>1.507 ** (0.500)</td>
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<td>High Disagreement # In-Partisan</td>
<td>0.360 * (0.592)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-0.568 + (0.312)</td>
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Observations  

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Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$,  
* $p < 0.05$,  
** $p < 0.01$
**Table OE4. 2008-2009 ANES - Entropy Balancing Results - Partisan Extremity**

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<td>-0.599**</td>
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<td>(0.201)</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

**Table OE5. 2008-2009 ANES - Entropy Balancing Results - Partisan Ambivalence**

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Standard errors in parentheses

* p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Table OE6. 2008-2009 ANES - Entropy Balancing Results - Knowledge & Econ Evals

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Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.10,  * p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.01